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Light on the Mayo: Recent Developments
May Diminish the Impact of Mayo
Foundation on Judicial Deference to Tax
Regulations
Matthew A. Melone*

Treasury regulations that require controlled entities that are
parties to research cost-sharing arrangements to share of equity
compensation costs allocable to research personnel have been
controversial for twenty years. Therefore, I was not surprised when
the Tax Court invalidated the regulations in 2015. That is, I was not
surprised until I read the court’s decision and discovered the reason
for the invalidation. The court wielded an administrative law
doctrine that had surfaced in a tax case a few years earlier.1 The
earlier case concerned a very technical tax accounting issue and
generated relatively little attention.2 The more recent case, however,
implicated billions of dollars in taxes and concerned the very visible
issue of tax base erosion.3 Moreover, because it was the second case in
recent years to apply an administrative law doctrine unfamiliar to the tax
area, the Treasury should be concerned.
The Treasury scored a major victory in 2011 when the Supreme Court
held that its regulations are entitled to the same standard of review
applicable to regulations issued by other agencies.4 Last year, however, the
Court refused to defer to the Treasury in its third decision concerning the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.5 That decision should have
raised some concern for the Treasury. This decision and the two
aforementioned decisions provide taxpayers fodder with which to challenge
the validity of tax regulations. The Treasury’s victory in 2011 may have
been, to some extent, pyrrhic.
*

J.D., University of Pennsylvania; C.P.A.; Professor of Law, Lehigh University, Bethlehem,

PA.
1.
See infra notes 196-217 and accompanying text.
2.
See infra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
3.
See infra notes 230-95 and accompanying text; See also Richard Rubin, Alphabet Is in Line
As Winner in IRS Case, WALL ST. J. Feb. 29, 2016, at B6 (reporting that the court’s decision could save
Google’s parent company at least $3.5 billion in federal income taxes).
4.
See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
5.
See infra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this article briefly describes the developments that led to the
passage of the Administrative Procedure Act, a statute enacted to rein in the
growing power and influence of administrative agencies. This part also
discusses Treasury rulemaking and the agency’s rather cavalier relationship
with the Administrative Procedure Act. The Treasury long had asserted
that regulations issued pursuant to a general statutory grant of authority
were not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, the
increased complexity of the tax code over the past thirty years led the
Treasury to more frequently issue regulations in temporary form without
the niceties of formal Notice and Comment procedures and to issue
substantive, often controversial rules, informally.
As a consequence, Treasury actions were not always afforded the
same level of deference enjoyed by other agencies’ actions. Part II
discusses the standards of review that the courts applied to Treasury
regulations. This had been an area of considerable confusion after the
Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision for almost three decades.
This part reviews the standards of review that existed pre-Chevron and the
confusion regarding Chevron’s application to tax regulations. In 2011, the
Court clarified that tax regulations are reviewable under the standards
applicable to regulations in general, firmly rejecting any notions of tax
exceptionalism.
As a result, Treasury regulations are pari passu with other regulations
and are entitled to Chevron deference to the same extent as other
regulations. At the time, this result was considered an unmitigated victory
for the Treasury because less deferential standards of review would no
longer apply to certain tax regulations. However, in light of recent
developments the Treasury’s victory may have been a mixed blessing. Part
III of this article discusses the Court’s decision in King v. Burwell. This
highly publicized—and politicized—case concerned the interpretation of
the tax credit provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
The Court agreed with the Treasury’s position on the issue but it did so
without deferring to the agency. In so doing, the Court raised some
interesting possibilities with respect to taxpayer challenges to Treasury
authority.
Part III describes a more troublesome development for the Treasury.
Approximately one year before Chevron, the Court set forth another
landmark administrative law doctrine in its State Farm decision. That
decision held that, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies
must articulate the reasons for their regulatory choices and such choices
must be reasonably connected to the facts found by the agencies. State
Farm has not been applied by the Court to any tax regulations and this
doctrine was—for all intents and purposes—ignored by the tax bar.
However, two courts, invoking State Farm, recently have invalidated
Treasury regulations. This Part III analyzes and critiques these cases.
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Many scholars and practitioners believe that Chevron and State Farm are
inseparable because the latter is incorporated into the former. However, I
disagree and believe that State Farm—in many circumstances—provides
independent grounds with which to challenge tax regulations.

TREASURY RULEMAKING: A CASUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The days when our economy operated largely without the watchful
eyes of a vast federal bureaucracy upon it are long gone and it is difficult to
imagine things otherwise.6 However, the federal government had limited
involvement in our nation’s economic affairs for almost half of its history.
The administrative state was spawned and grew, in part, as a counterweight
to the growth in power of business enterprises. Not surprisingly, it did not
take much time for the counterweight to need its own counterweight. A sea
change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and the
exigencies of World War II led to concerns that administrative agencies
had accumulated too much power and too often wielded that power in
inappropriate ways. As a result, Congress enacted major reform legislation
after the war. In the seven decades since, the Treasury has operated in its
own regulatory environment, subjecting itself to the rules by which
agencies in general, operate in some, but not all, cases.
THE GROWTH OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The importance of the federal government’s role in the nation’s
economic affairs increased in response to the industrialization of the
economy during the nineteenth century and to the post-Civil War need to
protect the newly acquired rights of African-Americans. The Progressive
movement inserted, rather fitfully thanks to Lochner,7 the public sector in
theretofore private matters. The creation of the Interstate Commerce

6.
One study reports that in 2015 Congress enacted 114 statutes and the regulatory agencies
issued 3,410 regulations. The direct and indirect cost of compliance with regulatory burdens was
estimated to be almost $1.9 trillion, or almost $15,000 per household; See Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Ten
Thousand Commandments, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (2016), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Wayne
%20Crews%20-%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%202016%20-%20May%204%202 016.pdf.
7.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a New York statute regulating
the hours of bakers was an unconstitutional infringement on the right and liberty to contract). The
Lochner era is considered to have closed with the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), a decision that upheld the constitutionality of Washington state’s minimum wage
law and overturned an earlier precedent to the contrary, Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525
(1923).
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Commission in 1887 marked the birth of what would become an immense
federal bureaucracy and the Progressive period resulted in the increased
regulation of railroads, the institution of occupational licensing, and the
enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act.8 The Supreme Court’s initial
resistance to expansive federal powers over economic matters, manifested
most dramatically in Dagenhart,9 eventually succumbed to the onslaught of
New Deal legislation.10 The alphabet soup of agencies to which we are
now beholden came into existence and, not surprisingly, grew both in
number and power. The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946 was the result of objections to the increasing power of executive
branch agencies, particularly during World War II, the waning popularity
of the Democratic Party, and the realization by reform proponents that
procedural safeguards were necessary in the face of the courts’ reluctance
to rein in the agencies.11
A detailed analysis of the Administrative Procedure Act is beyond the
scope of this work. The Act’s purposes are to inform the public about
agencies’ procedures, rules, and organization; provide the public with the
opportunity to participate in the rule making process; establish standards
for the promulgation of rules and adjudicating disputes; and set forth the
scope of judicial review of agencies’ actions.12 Except for military, foreign
affairs, and certain managerial, personnel, and other matters not relevant
here, the Act requires that notice and comment procedures be adhered to in
the promulgation of proposed regulations.13 However, the notice and
comments requirements do not apply to interpretive rules, general
8.
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439–66 (2d. ed.
1985).
9.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that compliance with child-labor
standards was beyond the reach of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce).
10. The Court’s narrow interpretation of the commerce power came to an end with its decision
in the seminal case of N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935). Any doubts as to the extent of the
federal commerce power were laid to rest several years later in Wickard v. Filburn., 317 U.S. 111
(1942)(holding that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate
activity that has an indirect effect on such commerce).
11. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–706 (2016)); Anthony W.
Mongone, Note, Business Roundtable: A New Level of Judicial Scrutiny and its Implications in a PostDodd-Frank World, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 746, 770–85 (2012).
12. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (Wm. W.
Gaunt & Sons 1973), available at http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/attorneygenerals manual.pdf.
13. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)-(b) (2016). In general, final regulations may not take effect within 30
days after notice is given. However, this requirement is inapplicable to regulations that relieve burdens
on those persons subject to the regulations. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(1)(2016). Tax regulations that are
favorable to taxpayers may be insulated from taxpayer challenges due to lack of standing. See infra
note 36 and accompanying text. Not all taxpayer-friendly regulations will be so insulated, however. For
example, standing was no barrier to challenges to Treasury regulations that interpreted the availability
of tax credits provided by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in a manner favorable to
taxpayers because the availability of tax credits to some taxpayers triggered particularized burdens on
other taxpayers. See infra notes 113, 117 and accompanying text.
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statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice.14 Moreover, an agency may dispense with notice and comment if
the agency finds, with good cause, that notice and comment procedures are
impractical, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.15
Treasury Rulemaking
The Treasury has exhibited a degree of cognitive dissonance with
respect to the applicability of certain provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act to its rulemaking actions.16 The Treasury derives its
regulatory authority from two sources. First, Congress may delegate it the
authority to issue rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of a
specific statute within the statute itself. The extent of the regulatory
authority granted to the Treasury in this manner typically is phrased in
broad language that authorizes the Treasury to prescribe regulations as may
be necessary and appropriate to carry out the statutory provisions in
question although it is not uncommon for Congress to reference specific
provisions within the statute indicating its expectation that regulations will
be forthcoming with respect to those provisions.17 A second source of
regulatory authority is Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 7805(a)
which delegates general regulatory authority to the Treasury for the
enforcement of the I.R.C.18
The Treasury took the position that regulations issued under the latter
delegation of authority were interpretative and, therefore, not subject to the

14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2016).
15. Id. An agency that invokes the good cause exception must set forth its reasons for doing so.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)(2016). The Attorney General’s Manual and the courts have interpreted the good
cause exception to apply in cases when timely guidance is critical and the notice and comments
requirement would impose an impediment to such timely guidance, minor rules with little public
interest, and the somewhat unusual case in which notice and comment would be counterproductive. See
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with the
Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1782 (2008).
16. The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) delegates regulatory authority to the Secretary of the
Treasury. The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.), however, has a significant role in the drafting of
regulations. See id. at 1154, n.3.
17. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 263A(i), 409A(e), 469(l)(CCH 2016).
18. I.R.C. § 7805(a)(CCH 2016). With certain exceptions, proposed, temporary, or final
regulations cannot have retroactive effect. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(CCH 2016). Temporary regulations must
also be issued in the form of proposed regulations and expire within three years of their issuance.
I.R.C. § 7805(e)(CCH 2016). All published proposed and temporary regulations must be submitted to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment on the impact that
such regulations will have on small business. The Treasury must consider comments from the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and discuss any response to such
comments in the preamble to final regulations. I.R.C. § 7805(f)(CCH 2016).
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notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.19
This distinction has been criticized by several commentators and
discounted by the courts.20 Congress exhibited a modicum of concern with
this practice and expressly required the Treasury to comply with the
provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act regardless of whether the
regulations are legislative or interpretative.21 Moreover, as the tax law
became more complex, particularly after the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, the Treasury came to rely on the issuance of temporary
regulations which are binding upon taxpayers without any opportunity for
pre-promulgation comment by interested parties.22 Congress took notice
and enacted I.R.C. section 7805(e) in 1988 mandating that temporary
regulations be issued contemporaneously with a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and that such temporary regulations expire within three
years.23
The I.R.S. regularly engages in informal rulemaking through the
issuance of revenue rulings and notices, neither of which are subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act.24 Revenue rulings are official, published

19. See Hickman, supra note 15, at 1158, n.16 (citing a study that found, in 232 regulatory
projects studied, the notice and comment requirement was explicitly disclaimed in almost 92 percent of
such projects).
20. See e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55–58
(2011) (applying the same standard of deference to regulations issued under a general grant of authority
that is applied to other regulations); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984) (stating that oftentimes legislative delegations are implicit); Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Comm’r, 515 F.3d 162, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2008)(holding that regulations promulgated pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 7805 have the force of law); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s
(Lack of)Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1760–73) (2007); S8ee also ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on
Judicial Deference [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report], 57 TAX LAW. 717 (2004).
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2016).
22. See Michael Asimov, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations,
44 TAX LAW. 343, 343 (1991). See also Hickman, supra note 15, at 1160. In a study conducted by
Professor Hickman, the Treasury frequently asserted that the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act did not apply to regulations, whether temporary or final, due to the good cause
exception. See Hickman, supra note 20, at 1749–51. Treasury’s invocation of the good cause exception
has been met with skepticism. See id. at 1782–86.
23. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6232(a), 102
Stat. 3342, 3734–35 (1988) (codified at I.R.C. § 7805(e)). Recently, the Treasury issued temporary and
proposed regulations to hinder inversion and post-inversion transactions pursuant to which a domestic
corporation relocates its domicile in a low tax jurisdiction but maintains significant operations in the
country of its former domicile. See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.304-7T; 1,367(a)-3T; 1.367(b)4T; 1.956-2T;1,7701(l)-4T;1.7874-1T-4T; 1.7874-6T-12T, 81 Fed. Reg. 20857 (April 8, 2016). The
issuance of these regulations reportedly scuttled the pending Pfizer-Allergan merger, as well as other
pending transactions. See Katie Thomas & Chad Bray, Pfizer Weighs Split as Allergan Deal Collapses,
N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2016, at B1; Domenic Chopping & Ben Tita, Tax Inversion Rules Complicate
Crane Deal, WALL ST. J., April 28, 2016, at B3(reporting that the new rules could derail a merger
between Terex Corp. and Konecranes Oyj).
24. The I.R.S. issues guidance in a number of forms including Revenue Procedures, Private
Letter Rulings, and Technical Advice Memoranda. A discussion of other forms of guidance is beyond
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interpretations of the tax law applicable to a particular set of facts and are
designed to both promote the uniform application of the tax laws and to
assist in taxpayers’ compliance with such laws.25 As explicitly noted in the
weekly Internal Revenue Bulletins in which the rulings are published,
rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations although they may be
used as precedent by taxpayers. Rulings are designed to apply the law to a
specific set of facts and, to that extent, can be fairly described as
interpretative. Notices often are used to provide guidance pending the
issuance of a ruling or proposed regulations and frequently contain
substantive interpretations of the tax law.26 Notices, in benign form,
provide taxpayers with much needed guidance pending the conclusion of
formal rulemaking. However, they also have been used to advance
controversial positions without any opportunity for public comment.
Notice 2008-83 is a particularly good example of such use.
Congress has long restricted the ability of corporate acquirers to
utilize the net operating losses of acquisition targets.27 Under current law,
if a corporate ownership change, as defined by the statute, occurs then
I.R.C. section 382(a) limits the amount of the taxable income for any postchange taxable year that may be offset by pre-change losses.28
the scope of this article. See Internal Revenue Service, Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer,
available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer.
25. See Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 C.B.1 (Jan. 2003); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 814–
15 (Jan. 1989).
26. See Internal Revenue Service, Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer, supra note 24.
The status of Notices relative to Revenue Rulings with respect to the deference that a court will afford
them is not clear. Compare Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 980–81 (6th Cir. 1994)(stating that
Revenue Rulings are entitled to greater deference) with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 78,
99 (1993)(stating that Revenue Rulings and Notices are entitled to equal deference). In some cases a
Notice will expressly state that it may be relied upon by taxpayers as if it were a Revenue Ruling. See
e.g., Notice 89-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422 (July 1989).
27. Congress attempted to restrict the ability of taxpayers to traffic net operating losses over 70
years ago. Section 129 of the Revenue Act of 1943 denied certain tax benefits, including deductions, if,
among other transactions, any person acquired control of a corporation and the principal purpose of
such acquisition was the evasion or avoidance of federal income tax. Revenue Act of 1943, Pub. L. No.
78-235, § 129, 58 Stat. 21, 47 (1944).
28. The I.R.C. § 382 limitation is equal to the value of the loss corporation multiplied by the
long-term tax-exempt rate. I.R.C. § 382(b)(1)(CCH 2016). The long-term tax–exempt rate is the
highest of the adjusted Federal long-term rates in effect during the three month period ending in the
calendar month in which the ownership change occurs adjusted for differences between long-term
taxable and tax exempt rates. I.R.C. § 382(f)(CCH 2016). The Federal long-term rate is a rate
published monthly by the I.R.S. that is determined by the average market yield on outstanding
marketable obligations of the United States with maturities in excess of nine years. See I.R.S. §
1274(d)(1)(CCH 2016). A business continuity requirement is also imposed under § 382. In the event
that the business enterprise of the old loss corporation is not continued at all times during the two year
period beginning on the date of the ownership change, the § 382 limitation is zero. I.R.C. §
382(c)(1)(CCH 2016). An ownership change occurs in one of two ways. First, an ownership change
occurs if the percentage of stock owned by one or more five percent shareholders increases by more
than fifty percentage points over the lowest percentage held by such shareholders during a three year
testing period. I.R.C. §§ 382(g); 382(i)(1); 382(k)(7)(CCH 2016). Changes in the percentage ownership
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Consequently, once the statutory threshold change in ownership occurs, net
operating losses that arose prior to the ownership change are available to
offset only a limited amount of taxable income in any taxable year. If the
corporation has net unrealized built-in losses in its assets on the date of the
ownership change then the losses subsequently recognized on those assets
during the five year period following the ownership change date are subject
to the same limitations as if such recognized losses were pre-change net
operating losses.29 In effect, the I.R.C. section 382 limitation will apply to
losses that would have been included in the net operating losses subject to
I.R.C. section 382 had they been recognized prior to the ownership change.
Notice 2008-83 was released on September 30, 2008 and its operative
provision interpreted the statutory built-in loss provision as it applied to
banks as follows:
For purposes of section 382(h), any deduction properly allowed
after an ownership change (as defined in section 382(g)) to a bank
with respect to losses on loans or bad debts (including any
deduction for a reasonable reserve for bad debts) shall not be
treated as a built-in loss or a deduction that is attributable to
periods before the change date.30
This notice was issued in the midst of the financial crisis and mitigated the
effect of the statutory rules on the acquirers of failing banks by overriding
the statutory stricture that bad debt deductions, after an ownership change,
were presumptively net recognized built-in losses unless the corporation
carried its burden of proof to show otherwise.31 The notice was
of five percent shareholders are termed “owner shifts.” I.R.C. § 382(g)(2)(CCH 2016). Alternatively,
an ownership change occurs due to certain tax-free reorganizations that result in a more that fifty
percentage point increase in the stock held by five percent or more shareholders over the lowest
percentage of stock held by such shareholders during a three year testing period. I.R.C. §§ 382(g);
382(i)(1); 382(k)(7)(CCH 2016). These transactions are termed “equity structure shifts.” I.R.C. §
383(g)(3)(2016).
29. I.R.C. §§ 382(h)(1)(B); 382(h)(7)(CCH 2016). A net unrealized built-in loss is the excess of
the adjusted tax basis of the assets of the corporation over the fair market value of such assets on the
change date. I.R.C. § 382(h)(3)(A)(i)(CCH 2016). Any deduction which is properly taken into account
during the five year recognition period is treated as a recognized built-in loss if such deduction is
attributable to the periods before the change date. I.R.C. § 382(h)(6)(B)(CCH 2016). Therefore,
depreciation, amortization, and bad debt deductions, may be treated as recognized built-in losses to the
extent that such depreciation or amortization is attributable to assets whose tax basis exceeded their fair
market value on the change date or to the extent that a bad debt deduction is taken on a receivable that
had already gone bad as of the change date. The statute provides a de minimis rule that ignores
unrealized built-in losses if such losses are minimal. I.R.C. § 382(h)(3)(B)(CCH 2016). Special rules
apply in the event that the corporation has net unrealized built-in gains, as opposed to losses, on the date
of the ownership change. See I.R.C. § 382(h)(1)(A)(CCH 2016).
30. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B 905.
31. Notice 2008-83 was a major factor in both the acquisition of Wachovia Bank by Well Fargo
and the acquisition of National City Bank by PNC Financial. See Eric Dash & Jonathan D. Glater,
Citigroup Says Judge’s Order Suspends Wachovia Deal, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 5, 2008, at A35; Eric Dash,
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immediately criticized as a bailout for the banking industry.32 As one
prominent Wall Street tax authority observed “[i]t couldn’t be clearer if
they had taken out an ad.”33 Senators Schumer of New York and Grassley
of Iowa publicly questioned the propriety of the notice and the latter
requested an internal Treasury review of the circumstances surrounding its
issuance.34 Congress overturned the notice with the passage of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, albeit prospectively.35
Unfortunately, taxpayers to whom the notice did not apply would have
encountered an insurmountable obstacle in challenging the legality of the
notice—standing.36 Had the I.R.S.’s position been subjected to public

PNC Gets National City in Latest Bank Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 24, 2008 at A4; See also ANDREW
ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (Penguin Books 2011) (reporting on effect that Notice 2008-83 had on
the Wachovia acquisition); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REP. (2011)
(reporting that, according to Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. chairwoman Sheila Bair, Notice 2008-83
was a significant factor in the Wells Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia). The Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission was created by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5,
123 Stat. 1617, 1625–31 (2009), to examine the causes of the 2008 financial crisis.
32. See e.g., Jesse Drucker, Obscure Tax Breaks Increase the Cost of Financial Rescue, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at A3; Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks: With Attention on Bailout
Debate, Treasury Made Change to Tax Policy, WASH. POST Nov. 10, 2008, at A01 (describing the
reaction of several tax lawyers to the Notice).
33. Joe Nocera, So When Will Banks Give Loans?, N.Y. TIMES Oct. 25, 2008, at B1 (quoting
Robert Willens).
34. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Seeks Answers from IRS, Treasury on
Tax Code Change that Subsidizes Bank Acquisitions (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://schumer.
senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/record.cfm?id=304737; Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley,
Ranking Member, United States Committee on Finance, Grassley Seeks Inspector General Review of
Treasury Bank Merger Move (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://finance/senate.gov/pressGpress/
2008/prg111408c.pdf. The Treasury’s inspector general admitted that a legitimate argument could be
made that the I.R.S. exceeded its authority in issuing the notice. See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REP., supra note 31, at 371.
35. Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1261, 123 Stat. 115, 342–43 (2009). Section 1261(a) of the legislation
stated Congress’ findings as follows:
The delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 382(m) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not authorize the Secretary to provide exemptions or
special rules that are restricted to particular industries or classes of taxpayers.
Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is inconsistent with the congressional intent in
enacting such section 382(m).
The legal authority to prescribe Internal Revenue Service Notice 2008-83 is doubtful. Id.
The legislation applied only to transactions that occurred after January 16, 2009. Id. Moreover,
the notice would remain in effect for ownership changes that occurred pursuant to contracts and certain
written agreements that were entered into on or before January 16, 2009. Id.
36. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 478–89 (1923) (explaining that federal taxpayer
standing jurisprudence had its genesis in the 1923. In that case, a taxpayer alleged that federal
expenditures under a statute increased her tax bill in violation of due process and the Court denied the
taxpayer standing because the effect of the expenditures on her federal tax liability was “too remote,
fluctuating, and uncertain” and that “her interest in moneys of the Treasury” was “shared with millions
of others”); Id. at 487 (illustrating that according to the Court, federal judicial power can be invoked by
a party upon a showing “not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally"); Id. at 488 (explaining that the Court has been similarly unreceptive to suits brought
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comment the public outcry could very well have prompted Congress to take
action before, not after, its provisions became applicable to any bank
acquisitions.
The Treasury’s cavalier approach to rulemaking came with a price.
For decades it was unclear whether Treasury regulations issued after notice
and comment were entitled to the deference enjoyed by regulations issued
by other agencies or whether such regulations were entitled to some lesser
degree of deference.

I. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO TREASURY REGULATIONS
Treasury regulations have enjoyed varying level of judicial deference.
The notion that tax regulations should be treated differently than other
types of regulations by the courts had many proponents. Calls for such tax
exceptionalism were rooted in both Treasury practice and in the ostensible
peculiarities of the tax law. The Court’s landmark decision, over three
decades ago, regarding deference to agency action sowed confusion as to
whether that decision applied to all Treasury regulations—a confusion that
was finally eliminated by the Court in 2011.

A. Pre-Chevron
Judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes is longstanding and, at least initially, had prudential roots. In Skidmore v, Swift &
Co., the Court acknowledged the limitations, in terms of both resources and
expertise, on the judicial branch, that place agencies in a favored position
to interpret congressional enactments.37 Under Skidmore, the deference
that an agency’s actions warrants depends upon the thoroughness of the
by members of Congress that allege an institutional injury but have allowed allegations of personal
injury to proceed). See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–19 (1997); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 514–22 (1969). See also Shays v. FEC, 414 F. 3d 76, 88–90 (D.C. Cir. 2005); U.S.
House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2008)(concluding that
legislators may have standing to challenge executive action in the absence of a particularized individual
harm if they have undertaken the challenge in a representational capacity. In a recent federal district
court case a committee of the House of Representatives had standing to enforce a subpoena issued by
the committee to a member of the executive branch). See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939
(1983) (stating, in dicta, that “. . . Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when
an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute agrees with plaintiffs that
the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional"); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013)
(highlighting the case that struck down the Defense of Marriage Act, the Bipartisan Litigation Advisory
Group (BLAG) of the House of Representatives petitioned to intervene to defend the statute as an
interested party after being notified by the Attorney General that the Department of Justice would not
defend the statute’s constitutionality. The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether BLAG had
standing its own right but Justices Alito and Thomas believed that BLAG did have standing to defend
the statute and would maintain the standing of a member of Congress to defend the constitutionality of
any statute provided that the member has the institutional imprimatur to do so); Id. at 2686, 2688.
37. 323 U.S. 134, 138–40 (1944).
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agency’s deliberations, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and other factors which provide the
agency with the power to persuade.38 Skidmore deference is vague and
offers judges tremendous flexibility in the degree to which they choose to
pay respect to agency decisions. Justice Scalia believed that Skidmore
deference was no deference at all.39
In 1979, the Court applied a multi-factor test to determine whether
Treasury regulations issued under the general authority of I.R.C. section
7805(a) were a permissible interpretation of a statute.40 Under this test—
the so called National Muffler test—the Court examined whether the
regulations in question were a contemporaneous construction of the statute
promulgated with the awareness of congressional intent; the length of time
that the regulations were in effect; the degree of reliance placed on the
regulations by affected parties; the consistency of the agency’s position;
and the degree of scrutiny given the regulations by Congress during
subsequent re-enactments of the statute.41 The Court later applied this test
in two cases decided not long after its National Muffler decision and, in
both cases, noted that less deference is owed to Treasury interpretations
issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805.42

B. Chevron
The seminal case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. was decided in 1984 and has sowed confusion for the
tax bar for three decades.43 Under Chevron, if the statute that is the subject
of the agency action does not directly address the precise question at issue
then a very deferential standard of review is applied to agency action that
had been subject to notice and comment.44 Under that standard, agency
action will not be disturbed unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious in
substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.45 This test, the lapidary
Chevron two-step test, is more deferential than the National Muffler test in
several respects. For example, under Chevron, whether the agency’s action
is consistent with its previous position on the matter at hand and whether
the regulation had been issued contemporaneously with the statute are not

38. Id. at 140.
39. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
41. Id. at 477.
42. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
43. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44. Id. at 842–43.
45. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 277.
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relevant to the level of deference due the agency.46 Moreover, the Court
has held that Chevron deference is owed to regulations that are contrary to
previous judicial holdings regarding the meaning of statutory terms.47
Chevron mandated deference to agency interpretations when its
conditions were met and was premised, like Skidmore, on prudential
grounds. The modern administrative state demands that agencies possess
specialized knowledge beyond the “ordinary knowledge” possessed by the
courts.48 Justice Ginsburg reiterated the prudential rationale for judicial
deference to agency action in a more recent case. “The expert agency is
surely better equipped to do the job than individual judges issuing ad hoc,
case by case injunctions. Federal judges lack the scientific, economic, and
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this
order.”49
In addition to prudential concerns, Chevron also rested on the notion
of congressional intent and the concomitant political accountability that
follows.50 Judicial deference to agency action is warranted because “[t]he
power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created .
. . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”51 Thus,
deference was owed to an agency regardless of whether Congress explicitly
delegated interpretative power to the agency or whether that delegation was
implicit. The two rationales for deference, expertise and political
accountability, are not always compatible with each other. Technocratic
expertise, dispassionately wielded, appears to rest uncomfortably with
political accountability and the horse trading that comes with such
accountability. It stands to reason that political considerations often will
countermand technical considerations—a point made by critics of
administrative power.
Such critics, including the House of
Representatives, question the political legitimacy of agency actions because

46. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4
(2005) (stating that lack of consistency does not undermine the case for deference); Cent. Laborers’
Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 (2004) (deferring to a regulation that upset a longstanding
agency position to the contrary); Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (applying Chevron
deference to a regulations issued approximately a century after the enactment of the statute). A recent
study of the application of Chevron at the Circuit Court level found that agencies prevail in disputes at a
significantly higher rate than they do when the courts review an issue de novo or apply a less deferential
standard of review. See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts (July
2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2808848.
47. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 982.
48. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 844.
49. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 428 (2011).
50. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
51. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843.
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of the inordinate influence that the regulated constituency often exerts over
the regulator.52
Ostensibly, Chevron has a constitutional dimension in that fealty to
congressional intent pays respect to separation of powers and to the notion
that policy debates are best resolved by the political branches. For several
reasons, however, the link between the Constitution and Chevron should be
considered tenuous at best. First, if deference is constitutionally mandated
then it begs the question of why it took so long for the Court to say so.
Second, deference to agency interpretations invites sweeping delegations of
authority from Congress to agencies, delegations which themselves may
either violate separation of powers principles or come close to doing so.53
Third, to underpin Chevron on the Constitution putatively renders any
explicit statutory provision that rejects or limits judicial deference,
including certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,
unconstitutional.54 Fourth, Chevron itself, in the resolution of its step one,

52. The House of Representatives passed the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016,
H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016) which would require a de novo judicial review of all relevant questions
of law and agency rules. There are several reasons for the oft-held perception of industry dominance
over regulators including resource disparities, political influence, informational disparities, and the
proverbial revolving door between agencies and their regulated constituents. See David J. Arkush,
Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1473-75 (2013).
53. Congress cannot delegate its Article I legislative powers. See Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649,
692 (1892). Broad delegations of regulatory authority to agencies call into question whether a
delegation is so broad that it constitutes an impermissible delegation by Congress of its legislative
authority. The Court has applied an “intelligible principle” test to determine whether a congressional
delegation is too broad. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989), the Court
succinctly described this test.
Applying this "intelligible principle" test to congressional delegations, our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives . . . . Accordingly, this Court has deemed it "constitutionally sufficient" if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it,
and the boundaries of this delegated authority.
The Administrative Procedure Act precludes judicial review of actions committed to agency
discretion by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (2016). The Court has held that this exception is to be
construed narrowly, applicable in the rare instances where the statutory terms are so broad that there is
no law to apply. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410–11 (1971).
The non-delegation doctrine set forth in Mistretta appears to be in tension with the “no law to apply”
standard set forth in Overton Park. See Viktoria Lovei, Revealing the True Definition of APA §
701(a)(2) by Reconciling “No Law to Apply” with the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047 (2006).
54. For example, the Freedom of Information Act mandates a de novo review of government
actions to withhold records from the public. See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Deference, Chenery,
and FOIA, 73 MD. L. REV. 1060 (2014). The Administrative Procedure Act provides a number of rules
regarding judicial review of agency rules and actions, including a provision that requires a court to
decide all relevant questions of law and to interpret statutory provisions and the meaning or
applicability of the terms of agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2016). If Chevron was constitutionally
required then any conflict it has created with provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act is not
problematic. However, critics of Chevron do not make this assertion and instead explain away any
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does not remove the judiciary from policy debates and instead often
requires the judiciary to immerse itself in policy matters. Whether or not
Congress has spoken clearly on an issue often turns on the judiciary’s
evaluation of a statute’s underlying policy or policies.55 Finally, statutes
contain gaps for a number of reasons not all of which reflect a
congressional desire to punt the issues to an agency.56 In such
circumstances Chevron deference represents nothing more than the ceding
of power by the judicial branch to the executive branch for prudential
reasons.57
seeming conflict between Chevron and the Administrative Procedure Act on policy grounds or,
alternatively, on the notion that Congress’s delegation of authority to an agency evidences a
congressional intent for the courts to defer to an agency. This latter explanation is problematic because
the Administrative Procedure Act cannot be overridden by another statute unless the other statute does
so expressly. See 5 U.S.C. § 559(2016). See generally Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 31 VA. TAX REV. 813, 816–22 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2585-91 (2006); John F.
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–203 (1998). Note
that the language of § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act also appears to conflict with the
deference that the courts provide to agency interpretations of their own regulations pursuant to the
standards set forth in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1991). Under Auer, an agency’s interpretation of
an ambiguous regulation is given controlling weight unless such interpretation is inconsistent with the
regulation or statute or is plainly erroneous. Id. at 461. Auer deference is not due an agency if its
interpretation is not the result of fair and considered judgment, conflicts with a prior interpretation, or
represents a convenient litigating position or a post-hoc rationalization. See Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (citations omitted). The Court, in United States v.
Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), stated that it saw no incongruity between a court’s de novo
review of both an agency’s determination of facts and its application of the law to those facts and a
court’s deference to an agency’s interpretation of the law. Id. at 391. In a recent case, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the Department of Education’s interpretation of its regulations under Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that such regulations required schools to treat transgender students consistent with
their gender identity. The Department’s interpretation—promulgated in an opinion letter issued by its
Office of Civil Rights—was entitled to deference under Auer. See Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.,
2016 U.S. APP. LEXIS 7026 (4th Cir. 2016). An interesting issue is whether deference is appropriate for
agency claims of preemption. If Chevron indeed is firmly rooted in the separation of powers then
preemption claims would implicate a conflict between the two structural pillars of the Constitution,
separation of powers and federalism. For an interesting discussion of deference in such circumstances
see William W. Buzbee, Does the Earth Belong to the Living? Property and Environmental Law
Perspectives on the Rights of Future Generations: Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory
Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1521
(2009). The House of Representatives passed a bill in 2016 that would require a court to undertake a de
novo review of agency rules. See supra note 52.
55. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue in the context of
the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding the availability of tax credits to purchasers of health
insurance on the Federal Exchange established under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
56. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
57. Two scholars have asserted that the President has the constitutional authority to gap-fill
statutory provisions. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115
YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006). If so, then Chevron need not be supported on congressional delegation
grounds. Moreover, the refusal to invoke Chevron for “extraordinary” issues that belie Congress’s
intent to delegate could not be justified because the executive branch’s authority is not predicated on
such intent. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chevron in the context of
“extraordinary” issues.
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Scholars have debated whether the two steps of the Chevron test are
redundant. Stephenson and Vermeule assert that “the single question is
whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory
interpretation; the two Chevron steps both ask the question, just in different
ways. As a result, the two steps are mutually convertible.”58 To be sure, an
agency interpretation that is contrary to Congress’s express intent cannot be
considered a reasonable interpretation. However, in such cases there is one
and only one interpretation that is reasonable. The counterargument to
Stephenson and Vermuele was compelling made by Richard Re who
asserted that Chevron step one provides the answer to the question of
whether Congress left only one permissible interpretation of a statute or
more than one.59 If, under Chevron step one, a genuine statutory ambiguity
exists, then Chevron step two defers to any number of interpretations, so
long as they are reasonable.60
In addition to the question of whether the two Chevron steps should be
collapsed into one step, a question whose answer had significant
implications for tax regulations persisted concerning Chevron’s
applicability to implicit delegations of authority. Five years prior to the
Chevron decision, National Muffler set forth the standard by which courts
were to determine whether and to what extent to defer to Treasury
regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805(a).61 After Chevron, the
continuing vitality of the National Muffler standard was unclear due to a
distinction between explicit and implicit delegations seemingly made by
Chevron itself.
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own

58. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV.
597, 599 (2009).
59. Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 610–16 (2014).
60. Id. Recasting Chevron step one as an inquiry into whether Congress mandated a particular
interpretation avoids the confusion that the Court has created in assessing whether Congress intended to
delegate authority over a particularly important issue. In reality, such an inquiry resolves Chevron step
one—the Congress had one particular result in mind and, therefore, no ambiguity existed. The Court’s
approach has been to find a statutory ambiguity, determine that the issue is too important for Congress
to have delegated to an agency, and then proceed to find that there is a clear congressional intent on the
matter after all. As discussed later in this article, this is precisely what the Court did in King v. Burwell.
See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.62
Some commentators, including the American Bar Association, believed
that Chevron set forth two separate step twos—an arbitrary, capricious,
manifestly contrary to the statute test for regulations promulgated under
explicit congressional delegations of authority and a less deferential
reasonable interpretation standard for regulations promulgated under
implicit congressional delegations of authority.63 Consequently, the
deference afforded to regulations issued pursuant to I.R.C. section 7805(a)
by National Muffler is appropriate after Chevron.64 United States v. Mead
is a case well known for the Court’s post-Chevron application of the less
deferential Skidmore standard of review to informal rules, in this case a
customs service ruling.65 Thus, the Court made explicit that the Skidmore
standard survived Chevron at least with respect to informal rule making.66
Mead is also interpreted by some, but not all, commentators as reinforcing
the distinction made by Chevron between the level of deference to be given
regulations issued pursuant to explicit and implicit delegations of
authority.67
If indeed the Chevron Court intended to create Step 2A, applicable to
regulations issued under explicit delegations, and Step 2B, applicable to
regulations issued under implicit delegations, then it left no guidance as to
the application of the standards it set forth. For example, whether a
delegation is explicit or implicit often is not clear. Many specific statutory
provisions are extremely complex, implicate a number of issues, and
contain a broad delegation of authority to issue regulations without limiting
that authority to any specific provision or provisions in the statute in

62. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843–44.
63. See Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light of
National Cable, Swallows Holding, and Other Developments, 61 TAX LAW 480, 495 (2008); ABA Task
Force Report, supra note 20, at 739.
64. Id. at 794.
65. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232–36; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000)(stating that Skidmore deference is applicable to informal agency actions such as
opinion letters, manuals, guidelines, and policy statements); Nelson v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 662, 665 (8th
Cir. 2009)(applying Skidmore deference to revenue rulings); Kornman & Assoc., Inc., v. United States,
527 F.3d 443, 452–57 (5th Cir. 2008)(concluding that Revenue Rulings are entitled to Skidmore
deference); but see Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 948 (9th Cir.
2008) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring)(concluding that Chevron deference was appropriate for a Revenue
Procedure). The Department of Justice has indicated that it will not argue for the application of
Chevron deference to Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures. See infra note 87 and accompanying
text.
66. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–35.
67. See Berg, supra note 63, at 494–95; ABA Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 739.
However, Mead contains language that supports the opposite conclusion. See Leandra Lederman, The
Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 BOSTON. U. L. REV. 643,
660–61 (2012).
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question.68 In many respects, such authority resembles the authority
granted by I.R.C. section 7805(a). In addition, the questions of how, and to
what degree, the reasonableness standard is less deferential that the
arbitrary, capricious, manifestly contrary to the statute standard were not
answered. Is it even possible that an administrative interpretation can be
unreasonable if such interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute? Most likely, the Court in both Chevron
and Mead used such terms interchangeably and simply was making clear
that both explicit and implicit delegations of regulatory authority by
Congress trigger coterminous levels of deference. In my opinion, the Court
put this issue to rest in 2011.69
After Chevron, the Court continued to apply the National Muffler test
to Treasury regulations issued under I.R.C. section 7805, albeit somewhat
inconsistently and without clear guidance on either the effect that Chevron
had on the applicability of this test or on how this test differed from
Chevron’s two step standard.70 As a result, confusion and contradiction
emanated from the lower courts and the Tax Court as to whether Chevron
replaced National Muffler, whether they are in fact similar, and when to
apply one standard versus the other.71 Critics of the application of Chevron
to tax regulations asserted a sort of tax exceptionalism pursuant to which a
lesser standard of deference was justified for tax regulations. Such
exceptionalism was warranted because of the inherent advantages enjoyed
by the I.R.S. over taxpayers, the severity of tax penalties, the sweeping
reach of the revenue collection function, and the particular importance of
agency expertise in administering statutes with the complexity of the tax
code.72 Moreover, unlike other agencies, Treasury actions often are

68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
70. See Berg, supra note 63, at 497; Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1579–86 (2006).
71. Berg, supra note 63, at 500–16 (discussing several Circuit Court cases and Tax Court cases).
In one case, the Tax Court stated that the National Muffler standard “had not been changed by Chevron,
but has merely been restated in a practical two-part test with possibly subtle distinctions as to the role of
legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation.” Cent. Pa. Savings Ass’n
& Subs. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 384, 392 (1995). According to the Court, the National Muffler and
Chevron standards are not similar. See infra note 78.
72. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 20, at 723–25. The idea of tax exceptionalism is not
universally held. See Hickman, supra note 70, at 1592–98. The notion that tax law is somehow
exceptional and that standards of deference should be adjusted accordingly is, in part, a result of the silo
effect—the propensity of agencies to develop their own bureaucratic eccentricities. The Treasury itself
has practiced its own brand of tax exceptionalism and, therefore, it is not surprising that the tax bar has
sought to counter with its own call for tax exceptionalism. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying
text; Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 510–
26 (2011).
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insulated from taxpayer challenge due to the inability of taxpayers to
maintain standing or by the application of the Anti-Injunction Act.73

C. Mayo
In 2011 the Court decided Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research v. United States and held that the Chevron standard applied
to all Treasury regulations issued after notice and comment.74 Rejecting
any notions of tax exceptionalism, the Court acknowledged that the
administrative landscape had changed over the years and that no special
rules were warranted for tax regulations.75 Accordingly, tax regulations are
entitled to Chevron deference regardless of their source of authority.76
Mayo presented the question of whether physicians who serve as
medical residents were entitled to a student exemption from certain federal
payroll taxes. The I.R.S. promulgated a regulation pursuant to the general
grant of authority under I.R.C. section 7805 that denied medical residents
an exemption from the applicable payroll taxes. The Court upheld the

73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of taxpayers standing. The
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
tax . . . in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.” I.R.C. § 7421(a)(CCH 2016). In effect, § 7421 requires that taxpayers resolve their tax
disputes in a suit for refund and provides legislative notice of the “[g]overnment’s need to assess and
collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial interference.”
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 103 (2004). This statute is a significant burden if the regulations have a
particularly large negative impact on pending transactions, such as the recently issued tax inversion
rules. There are several exceptions to the statute’s prohibition including the ability of a federal district
court to issue an injunction to prevent irreparable harm to the property rights of others in the context of
a levy or sale of property by the I.R.S. See I.R.C. § 7426(b)(CCH 2016). Moreover, third parties are
expressly provided standing to vindicate an interest in property that has been wrongfully levied. I.R.C.
§ 7426(a)(CCH 2016). Exceptions to the statute are also provided for collection activities undertaken in
certain cases that involve innocent-spouse relief or undertaken during the pendency of a Tax Court
proceeding challenging federal liens and levies. See I.R.C. §§ 6015(e)(1)(B)(2); 6330(e)(CCH 2016).
The Court has held that proceedings whose success would have the effect of increasing tax revenue are
not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. at 102–12. See also E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1283–85 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Court also has recognized two
common law exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. First, a pre-enforcement challenge will be
countenanced if the government could not prevail under any circumstances and the taxpayer would
suffer irreparable harm from enforcement action. See Enoch v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Second, a preenforcement action is permitted if, under the circumstances, no
other legal remedy is available. See South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378, 380–81 (1984).
Whether an exaction is a tax, subject to the Anti-Injunction Act, or a penalty was at issue in the Court’s
landmark decision upholding the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
See infra note 107. The D.C. Circuit recently held that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded a taxpayer
challenge to certain income reporting requirements imposed on U.S. banks by Treasury regulations.
See Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U. S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied
2016 U.S. LEXIS 3683 (June 6, 2016).
74. 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
75. Id. at 56–57.
76. Id. at 57–58.
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regulation under the Chevron standard.77 The Court forcefully rejected the
notion that tax regulations are somehow entitled to less deference than the
regulatory action of other agencies.
. . . Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying
a less deferential standard of review to Treasury
Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any
other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are
not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative
review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have
expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative
action” . . . . Filling in gaps in the Internal Revenue Code
plainly requires the Treasury Department to make
interpretive choices for statutory implementation at least
as complex as the ones other agencies must make in
administering their statutes . . . . We see no reason why
our review of tax regulations should not be guided by
agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent
as our review of other regulations.78
The Court, in my opinion, also put to rest the belief that Chevron set forth
two versions of its step two, one version applicable to regulations
promulgated pursuant to explicit congressional delegations of authority and
another version for regulations issued pursuant to implicit congressional
delegations of authority.79 The Court appeared to consider the two
formulations of step two as interchangeable. After concluding that the
statute’s ambiguity allowed it to proceed to step two of Chevron, the Court
stated that “such an ambiguity would lead us inexorably to Chevron step
two, under which we may not disturb an agency rule unless it is ‘[arbitrary
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.]’”80 The
Court, after explaining at length why Chevron deference was appropriate in
this case, then applied step two by inquiring whether the regulation in
question was a ‘“reasonable interpretation”’ of the statute.81
The Court’s opinion also called into question just what constitutes an
explicit or implicit delegation of authority and whether such a distinction
matters. The Court stated that the regulation at issue in the case was issued
“pursuant to the explicit authorization” set forth in I.R.C. section 7805(a)
and that such “express congressional authorizations” indicate that Chevron

77. Id. at 58–60.
78. Id. at 55–56. The Court also made clear the distinction between the Chevron and National
Muffler standards and why the former is significantly more deferential than the latter. Id. at 54–55.
79. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
80. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 53 (citations
omitted).
81. Id. at 58.
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deference is warranted. If indeed I.R.C. section 7805 provides explicit
authorization for Treasury rule-making, then it is difficult to conceive of
any Treasury regulation that would be issued under any authority other than
explicit authority.
However, in King v. Burwell the Court stated that if a statutory
ambiguity constitutes any delegation of authority then it constitutes “an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps.”82 Because Chevron deference is predicated on the existence of a
statutory ambiguity, if one takes King v. Burwell at face value then all
Chevron deference is reserved for regulations issued under implicit grants
of congressional authority. Mayo and King v. Burwell are irreconcilable in
this respect. Under Mayo, all regulations, whether they are issued under
the authority provided by I.R.C. section 7805 or under the authority of a
substantive I.R.C. section, represent action taken pursuant to an explicit
grant of authority from Congress. In contrast, under King v. Burwell any
agency authority to resolve a statutory ambiguity is a result of an implicit
grant of authority to the agency by Congress. The Court made clear in
King that the intent of Congress is the determining factor in whether
deference to an agency’s action is warranted.83 The inconsistency between
Mayo and King v. Burwell in the Court’s categorization of authority
indicates that whether regulatory authority is made explicit or implicit is
not important.
Chevron left a number of issues—tax and otherwise—unresolved and
Mayo did not resolve all deference questions with respect to Treasury
actions.84 For example, whether Chevron deference is predicated on the
issuance of regulations after notice and comment is not clear. Mayo hinted
that notice and comment is a prerequisite for Chevron deference but did not
say so categorically. “The Department issued the full-time employee rule
only after notice-and- comment procedures, . . . again a consideration
identified in our precedents as a ‘significant’ sign that a rule merits
Chevron deference.”85 Thus, whether temporary Treasury regulations are
entitled to Chevron deference is unlikely and, if not, whether National

82. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). See infra note 129 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Court’s decision that Chevron deference was not warranted in this case.
83. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
84. Two scholars posed 14 questions that they believe Chevron left unanswered in addition to
the basic question of whether there are certain subject matters for which deference is not appropriate.
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 849–52 (2001).
85. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 57–58 (citing Mead
v. United States, 533 U.S. at 230–31, and Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 351 U.S. 158,173–
74 (2007)).
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Muffler or Skidmore deference should apply is unclear.86 Informal actions,
such as revenue rulings and notices appear to warrant, after Mead,
Skidmore deference—an opinion that is shared by the government. The
Department of Justice has stated that it will not argue that Chevron
deference applies to revenue rulings or revenue procedures.87
After Mayo, the deference to which Treasury regulations issued after
notice and comment are entitled no longer depends upon their source of
authority. Mayo, therefore, was a win for the Treasury because, assuming
that Chevron step one is met, Chevron and not Skidmore, National Muffler,
or some other less deferential test will be applied to test the validity of
Treasury regulations. Whether this result is desirable as a policy matter
depends on whether one believes in tax exceptionalism, whether Mayo will
embolden the Treasury to exercise its interpretative authority more
aggressively, and whether it will provide impetus for the Treasury to
submit to notice and comment procedures more frequently.88

86 The Seventh Circuit, however, indicated that it would apply Chevron deference to temporary
regulations, at least those that have been replaced by nearly identical final regulations issued after
notice and comment.
This temporary regulation, which was issued without notice and comment at the same
time as an identical proposed regulation, purports to offer taxpayers guidance by
resolving an open question and stating definitively that in the case of a disposition of
property, an overstatement of basis can lead to an omission from gross income. This
temporary regulation has since been replaced by a nearly identical final regulation, issued
after a notice and comment period. T.D. 9511 (eff. Dec. 14, 2010), 75 Fed. Reg. 78, 897.
Because we find that Colony is not controlling, we need not reach this issue. However,
we would have been inclined to grant the temporary regulation Chevron deference, just as
we would be inclined to grant such deference to T.D. 9511. We have previously given
deference to interpretive Treasury regulations issued with notice-and-comment
procedures, see Kikalos v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 190 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir.
1999); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 979–84 (7th Cir.
1998), and the Supreme Court has stated that the absence of notice-and-comment
procedures is not dispositive to the finding of Chevron deference. Barnhart v. Walton,
535 U.S. 212, 222, 122 S. Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002).
See Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011). It is not clear whether proposed
regulations are entitled to any deference whatsoever although the Court has indicated that such
regulations are not so entitled. In rejecting the taxpayer’s reliance on proposed regulations the Court
stated that “. . . we find these proposed regulations to be of little consequence given that they were
nothing more than mere proposals.” Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 453 n.13 (2003).
87. See Marie Sapirie, DOJ Won’t Argue for Chevron Deference for Revenue Rulings and
Procedures, Official Says, 131 TAX NOTES 674 (May 16, 2011).
88. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA.
TAX REV. 269, 275–78, 289–98 (2012)(setting forth the benefits of the Mayo decision but cautioning
that Mayo, when combined with Brand X, Auer, and other doctrines could lead to Treasury overreach).
See supra notes 46, 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Brand X and Auer. A recent study of
the Circuit Courts’ application of Chevron found that Chevron is invoked somewhat less frequently in
tax cases but, when invoked, the Treasury’s win rate is relatively high. See Barnett & Walker, supra
note 46, at 48, Table 2.
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II. MAYO DIMINISHED? THE EXTRAORDINARY ISSUE
AND STATE FARM
Two recent developments call into question whether Mayo has
provided a veritable carte blanche to the Treasury to interpret the I.R.C.
First, the Supreme Court, in the third of its trilogy of cases involving the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, refused to apply Chevron to
the Treasury regulations at issue in that case.89 The Court’s rationale for its
refusal to defer to the Treasury was not altogether convincing but the
Court’s decision nonetheless could provide support for taxpayer assertions
that deference to the Treasury is unwarranted. Second, another fundamental
but different administrative law doctrine recently has appeared on the tax
landscape—the State Farm doctrine.90 Two recent cases applied this
doctrine to invalidate Treasury regulations.91 Perhaps it was inevitable that
the Mayo Court’s refusal to provide special treatment for Treasury
regulations would lead to the application of other administrative law
doctrines that, up to that time, were ignored in the tax context. Mayo may
very well turn out to be a mixed blessing for the Treasury.

A. King v. Burwell and the Extraordinary Issue
On occasion, the Court seemingly interjects an extra step into the
Chevron analysis. The Court proceeds to discover a statutory ambiguity but
then inquires whether the ambiguity implicates an issue of such
importance—an extraordinary case—that it is unlikely that Congress would
have implicitly delegated authority to an agency to resolve the issue.
Despite the Court’s rhetoric, what the Court appears to do in these cases is
apply a more searching inquiry in resolving Chevron step one.
For example, whether the FDA had the authority to regulate tobacco
products was the issue before the Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.92 The Court, after twenty-three pages of explanation,

89. See infra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. The first in the trilogy of cases was Nat’l
Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). In that case, the Court upheld the statute’s
requirement that individuals obtain health insurance coverage or face financial penalties. The Court,
despite holding that enactment of this provision did not fall within the Commerce Power, believed that
it was within Congress’s power to tax and spend. Id. at 2577. In that same case the Court struck down,
on federalism grounds, the parts of the legislation that expanded Medicaid coverage. Id. at 2606–07.
The second case in the trilogy was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751(2014). The
Court held that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the statute’s requirement to provide
certain contraceptive coverage could not be enforced against three closely held corporations.
90. See infra notes 159-95 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 196-295 and accompanying text.
92. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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concluded that Congress did not intend to authorize the FDA to regulate
tobacco products.93
Finally, our inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue is shaped, at least in some
measure, by the nature of the question presented. Deference
under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity
constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency
to fill in the statutory gaps. See Chevron, 467 U. S., at 844. In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit
delegation.94
The Court went on to quote from a law review article written by Justice
Breyer before he was confirmed to the Court. “A court may also ask
whether the legal question is an important one. Congress is more likely to
have focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving
interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily
administration.”95
As the Court exhaustively documented, Congress’s intent was clear.
Therefore, there was no longer any ambiguity and whether or not the issue
presented was extraordinary should have been irrelevant. Step one of
Chevron was not met and, as a consequence, step two is not applicable.
The Court’s reasoning in the FDA case recently was parroted in the Court’s
most recent ObamaCare decision, King v. Burwell.96 At issue in this case
was whether federal tax credits are available to individual enrollees in the
Federal Exchange. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
established the American Health Benefit Exchanges [hereinafter
Exchanges], governmental or non-profit entities that, among other
functions, serve as insurance marketplaces in which individuals have the
ability to comparison shop for insurance products.97 Each state must create
and operate an Exchange that offers insurance for purchase by individuals
and employees of small employers.98 A state may opt out of creating and
operating an Exchange in which case the Exchange will be established by

93. Id. at 133–56.
94. Id. at 159.
95. Id. (quoting Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
363, 370 (1986)).
96. 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015).
97. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1311, 124 Stat. at 173
(codified at 41 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(1)–(4)(2016)).
98. Id., § 1311(b), 124 Stat. at 173 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(2016)). After 2016, states
have the option of allowing large employers to participate in the Exchanges. Id., § 1312(f)(2)(B), 124
Stat, at 184 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18032(2016)). Under certain circumstances, a state may participate
in a multi-state regional Exchange or establish subsidiary Exchanges to operate within a state. Id., §
1311(f), 124 Stat. at 179 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18031(2016)). See also 45 C.F.R. § 155.140 (2013).
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the federal government.99 Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have
established Exchanges.100
The Act added section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code.101 This
provision, commonly referred to as the individual mandate, is designed to
minimize adverse selection in light of the insurance market reforms that
were part of the legislation.102 The individual mandate requires that an
applicable individual maintain minimum essential coverage for herself and
any dependents who are also applicable individuals each month beginning
after 2013.103 Failure to maintain such coverage for one or more months
results in the imposition of a shared responsibility payment, a penalty that
is included with a taxpayer’s income tax return for the taxable year which
includes the month that such failure occurred.104
A significant number of individuals obtain health insurance through
their employers, a delivery mechanism that had its genesis as a mechanism

99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1321(c), 124 Stat. at 186 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 18041 (2016)). These Exchanges may be operated exclusively by the Department of Health
and Human Services or in partnership with the state with authority over the operation of the Exchange
residing within the Department of Health and Human Services. See Bernadette Fernandez & Annie L.
Mach, Health Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
Cong. Res. Serv. 12-13 (Jan. 31, 2013). Seven Exchanges operate under this model. Four states
operate federally supported Exchanges. These Exchanges are operated by state authorities through the
use of federal information technology infrastructure. See State Health Insurance Marketplace Types,
2016, http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/.
100. See id.
101. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§1501(b); 10106(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 244–
49,909–10 (2010)(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 5000A (CCH 2016). The penalty amount imposed
by the statute was amended shortly thereafter by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §1002, 124 Stat.1029, 1032–33 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 5000A(CCH
2016)). This provision survived a constitutional challenge when the Court upheld it under Congress’s
taxing power despite holding that its enactment exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce. See supra note 89.
102. Among the insurance market reforms instituted by the legislation are community rating and
guarantee issue requirements. Insurers may not price discriminate on any basis except age, family size,
smoking, and geographic areas. Consequently, insurers can neither deny coverage to those individuals
with pre-existing medical conditions nor price their coverage to account for such pre-existing
conditions. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1201, 124 Stat. at 155 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, 300gg-3(2016)). Adverse selection refers to the propensity of those most in need of
insurance to purchase it while those individuals with little or no perceived need of insurance—the
young and healthy, for example—forego its purchase. Adverse selection reduces the number of no or
low claim customers needed by the insurers to keep premiums affordable.
103. I.R.C. § 5000A(a)(CCH 2016). The term “applicable individual” excludes individuals who
qualify for statutorily defined religious conscience or health ministry exemptions, individuals who are
not citizens or nationals of, or legal aliens present in, the United States, or who are incarcerated. I.R.C.
§ 5000A(d)(CCH 2016). Individuals whose required contribution exceeds eight percent of household
income, very low income individuals, and members of Indian tribes are not subject to the penalty.
I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)–(3)(CCH 2016).
104. I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)–(2)(CCH 2016). The requirement to maintain minimum essential
coverage is variously met through, among other means, Medicare or Medicaid coverage, individual
insurance policies, or eligible employer-sponsored group health plans or insurance coverage. I.R.C. §
5000A(f)(CCH 2016).
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to avoid wage controls during World War II and that is aided and abetted
by income tax subsidies,105 I.R.C. section 4980H was added by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act to prevent employers from free riding
on the statute’s tax credits and subsidies by not offering adequate health
insurance coverage to their employees.106 This provision imposes an
exaction on certain employers if they either do not offer insurance coverage
to their employees or offer coverage that is deemed inadequate under the
statute.107 An assessable payment is imposed on employers with an
average of fifty or more full time or full time equivalent employees if such
employers fail to offer affordable minimum essential health care coverage
to their full time employees and one or more such employees qualify for
the tax credit or premium subsidies.108 In addition, an excise tax is
imposed in the amount of $100 per day for each affected individual if the

105. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14389, 2009). The system has been subject to much criticism by economists because, among other
things, it provides greater subsidies to higher income individuals, masks the true cost of coverage to the
insured resulting in the overconsumption of medical care, and distorts labor market mobility due to lack
of portability. See id. at 8–14. The portability issue has been addressed to a very limited extent by the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986),
under which, in general, employers with twenty or more full time equivalent employees must offer
medical coverage for a period of eigthteen months to an employee or covered family member after a
qualifying event. Among qualifying events are voluntary or involuntary termination of employment,
divorce, death, and disability. The employee must pay for the cost of coverage plus an allowable
administrative fee.
106. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1513, 10106(e), 124 Stat. at 253–56, 910–11
(codified as amended in I.R.C. § 4980H (CCH 2016)). See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the tax credit.
107. I.R.C. § 4980H (CCH 2016). A federal district upheld the constitutionality of the employer
mandates but its decision was vacated by the Fourth Circuit due to the application of the Ant-Injunction
Act, discussed at supra note 73. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va.,
2010), vacated, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011). The Court later held that
the individual mandate was a tax for constitutional purposes but that it was a penalty for purposes of the
Anti-Injunction Act. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. at 2594. In light of its holding in
Sebelius, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit.
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012). The Fourth Circuit then upheld the constitutionality of
the employer mandate. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733 F.3d 72 (4th Cir., 2013) cert. denied Liberty
Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 134 S.Ct. 683 (2013).
108. I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a)(1); 4980H(c)(2)(A)(CCH 2016). A full-time employee is defined as an
employee who is employed an average of at least 30 hours per week. I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A) (CCH
2016). Full-time equivalent employees are a combination of employees, none of whom are full-time
employees, who are counted as full-time employees for purposes of determining whether an employer is
an applicable large employer. See Treas. Reg. § 54.49809H-1(a)(22) (2015). The full time equivalency
rules apply only for the purposes of determining whether an employer employs an average of 50 or
more full time employees and not for the purpose of determining the penalty amount. I.R.C. §
4980H(c)(2)(E)(CCH 2016). Failure to offer such coverage results in the imposition of a penalty up to
$ 2,000 per annum for each full time employee in excess of thirty if no coverage is provided and one
employee qualifies for a premium tax credit or cost sharing subsidy. I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a);
4980H(c)(1)(CCH 2016). The maximum annual penalty amount is $3,000 if unaffordable coverage is
offered. I.R.C. §§ 4980H(a)(1); 4980H(b)(1)(CCH 2016).
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group health plan does not conform to the requirements of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.109
The legislation, through the enactment of I.R.C. section 36B, provides
tax credits to individuals and families whose income is below a certain
threshold and who pay premiums for insurance through an Exchange
established by the State under section 1311 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.110 The credit is designed to subsidize health
insurance coverage for taxpayers whose income does not exceed 400
percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved.111 In general,
the credit is the lesser of the premium cost or the excess of the premium
cost of a baseline plan over a percentage, which increases as the taxpayer’s
household income approaches 400 percent of the poverty line, of the
taxpayer’s household income.112

109. See I.R.C. §§ 4980D(a)–(b); 9815(CCH 2016). The excise tax imposed by § 4980D
predates the enactment of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The excise tax is triggered by
the failure of a plan to conform to the requirements of chapter 100 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C.
§ 4980(a)(CCH 2016). I.R.C. § 9815 was added to chapter 100 by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act to incorporate its changes into chapter 100. See Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, § 1563(f), 124 Stat. at 270 (as redesignated by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §
10107(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 911). Plans cannot exclude coverage of preexisting conditions, must not, in
general, impose lifetime or annual limits on the dollar amount of benefits, must offer coverage to
dependent children under the age of twenty-six, and provide coverage of preventive services. See
generally Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 54.9815-2704T(2010) 54.9815-2711T(2010); 54.9815-2713T(2012);
54.9815-2714T(2010). The application of both section 4980H and the excise tax were at issue in the
Court’s recent holding that closely-held corporations are protected by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768, 2777–78, 2780–81
(2014).
110. I.R.C. §§ 36B(a); 36B(c)(2)(A)(CCH 2016). An individual who is covered under any
eligible employer-sponsored plan or who is offered health insurance coverage through an eligible
employer-sponsored plan under which the employee’s required contribution with respect to the plan
does not exceed 9.5 percent of the applicable taxpayer’s income and which covers at least 60 percent of
total benefit costs are not eligible for the credit. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(CCH 2016). A taxpayer also is
ineligible for the credit is she is offered minimum essential coverage other than such coverage through
the individual market. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)(CCH 2016). Advance payments of the credits may be
made in the form of reductions to the monthly insurance premiums and such advance payments reduce
the amount of the credit under § 36B. I.R.C. § 36B(f)(1)(CCH 2016). In the event that advances exceed
the credit amount to which the taxpayer is entitled the excess amount advanced increases the income tax
owed by the taxpayer subject to certain limitations based on the level of the taxpayer’s household
income. I.R.C. § 36B(f)(2)(CCH 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-4 (2012).
111. I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(CCH 2016).
112. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(B)–(C)(CCH 2016). The applicable percentage varies from a minimum of 2
percent to a maximum of 9.5 percent subject to adjustment to account for the possibility that health
insurance costs increase faster than the rate of income growth. Additional adjustments are to be made
beginning in 2019 if premium cost increases exceed the growth in the consumer price index and the
subsidies exceed a certain level of gross domestic product. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(CCH 2016).
Household income is the sum of the adjusted gross income, with certain modifications, of all
individuals who were taken into account in determining the taxpayer’s family size and were required to
file a tax return for the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 36B(d)(2)(CCH 2016). The federal poverty line is the
most recently published poverty guideline as of the first day of the regular enrollment period for
coverage through an Exchange for the calendar year. Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-1(h)(2012).
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The allowance of a tax credit can trigger the applicability of the
individual mandate with respect to the individual entitled to the credit
because the credit reduces such individual’s required contribution for
purposes of determining whether insurance coverage is affordable by such
individual and, therefore, mandated.113 In addition, the attainment of a
credit or cost sharing reduction by one employee triggers the penalty
imposed on employers by I.R.C. section 4980H.114
On its face, I.R.C. section 36B limits eligibility for tax credits to
taxpayers who are enrolled in State Exchanges.115 However, regulations
were issued pursuant to which participants in the Federal Exchange would
also qualify for the credit.116 Virginia did not establish an Exchange and its
residents may purchase health insurance through HealthCare.gov, the
Federal Exchange. Several Virginia residents challenged the validity of the
regulations that entitled qualified enrollees on Federal Exchanges to a tax
credit because the availability of such credit rendered their insurance costs
affordable under the statute thereby subjecting them to the individual
mandate.117 The Fourth Circuit applied Chevron and unanimously affirmed
the district court’s holding that the Treasury regulations were within the
Treasury’s authority.118 The court held that the statutory language did not
unambiguously reveal the intent of Congress with respect to the availability
of tax credits for individuals enrolled on the Federal Exchange.119 The
court then proceeded to Chevron step two.120 According to the court, the
Treasury regulations were a permissible interpretation of the statute
because the objectives of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
113. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(B)(ii)(CCH 2016).
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.36B-1(k)(2012)(defining Exchange by reference to 45 C.F.R. §
155.20); 1.36B-2(a)(2012)(providing eligibility for credit by enrollment in an Exchange); 45 C.F.R. §
155.20(2012)(stating that the term Exchange refers to State Exchanges, regional Exchanges, subsidiary
Exchanges, and a Federally-facilitated Exchange)(emphasis added).
117. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
118. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’g King v. Sebelius, 977 F.Supp. 2d 415
(E.D. Va. 2014).
119. Id. at 369. The language of I.R.C. § 36B referred only to Exchanges established by a State,
but the court refused to “‘confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.’” Id.
at 368 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007)). The
court believed that § 1311, the provision authorizing State exchanges, § 1321, the provision authorizing
the Federal Exchange, and a definitional provision of the Act could plausibly be read to treat the
Federal Exchange as an Exchange established by a State. Id. at 369. The court also found that two
other statutory provisions were irreconcilable with the appellants’ assertion that I.R.C. § 36B denies the
availability of credits to taxpayers enrolled on the Federal Exchange. See id. at 369–71. Moreover, the
court found little guidance in the legislative history of the statute. Despite the fact that several floor
statements by Senators indicated that all taxpayers would have access to the credits, such statements
could have been made under the assumption that all states would establish Exchanges and that the
denial of credits to taxpayers enrolled in the Federal Exchange would induce states to establish their
own Exchanges. Id. at 371–72.
120. Id. at 372.
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are to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and
to decrease the cost of health care.121 Therefore, the broad availability of
tax credits to subsidize the cost of health insurance is congruent with the
statute’s objectives.122
A similar challenge to the Treasury regulations was brought before the
D.C. Circuit by individual appellants who resided in states that did not
establish Exchanges.123 In a 2-1 decision, the court reversed the district
court’s judgment that upheld the validity of the regulations.124 Unlike the
Fourth Circuit, the court found no need to proceed to Chevron step two
because it believed that Congress did speak directly to the precise question
at issue and that tax credits are available only for enrollees in State
Exchanges as the statutory language of section 36B made clear.125
The Court, in King v. Burwell, affirmed the judgment of the Fourth
Circuit and held that enrollees on the Federal Exchange are entitled to tax
credits.126 Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, briefly reviewed the
economic underpinnings of the legislation, took notice of unsuccessful
efforts by various states to expand individuals’ access to health insurance
coverage, and contrasted those efforts with the efforts of states that
achieved success in expanding health insurance coverage.127
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court did not believe that the Treasury
regulations were entitled to Chevron deference. According to the Court,
the deference afforded administrative agencies in their interpretations of

121. Id. at 373–74.
122. Id. at 374–75.
123. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’g Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F.Supp.
3d 1 (D.D.C., 2014). The decision of the court was vacated and a rehearing en banc was granted.
Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17099 (Sept. 4, 2014). However, the case subsequently was
held in abeyance pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Halbig v. Burwell, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
23434 (Nov. 12, 2014).
124. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d at 399.
125. According to the court, the Federal Exchange is equivalent to State Exchanges in certain
respects but it differs from State Exchanges in one crucial respect—it is not established by a State as
required by the language of I.R.C. § 36B. Id. at 400. Section 1321 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, the provision that authorizes the Federal Exchange, omits any language that
suggests that such Exchange should be treated as a State Exchange. Id. The court presumed that
Congress’s use of dissimilar language in different parts of a statute was intentional, rejected the
government’s contention that all Exchanges are, by definition, established by a State, and held that the
absurdity doctrine did not apply. Id. at 400–402. Despite the fact that the court believed that the
statutory language was unambiguous, it did proceed to examine the legislative history of the statute. In
the court’s opinion, the legislative history failed to provide demonstrable evidence that Congress
intended to provide tax credits to eligible enrollees on all Exchanges. The court found the legislative
history inconclusive in this respect and believed that a reasonable inference could be drawn that the
limitation of credits to enrollees in State Exchanges was a means to incentivize states to establish their
own Exchanges. Id. at 408. Moreover, it refused to countenance the absence of any suggestion in the
legislative history that credits be so limited as evidence of an intent to the contrary because silence is
not evidence that Congress meant something other than what it said. Id. at 408.
126. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2496. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Id.
127. Id. at 248–86.
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statutory ambiguities under Chevron is premised on the notion that such
ambiguities “constitute an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency
to fill in the statutory gaps.”128 This implication may be unwarranted in
“extraordinary cases” and, according to the Chief Justice Roberts, this was
an extraordinary case.129
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving
billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price
of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits
are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep
“economic and political significance” that is central to this
statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. . . . It is
especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this
decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health
insurance policy of this sort. . . . This is not a case for the IRS.130
Plain statutory language is enforceable according to its terms but whether
such language is, in fact, plain “‘may only become evident when placed in
context . . . and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme”’131 At this point, King v. Burwell degenerated into an exercise in
statutory interpretation. The majority, by my count, employed three canons
of statutory construction: the words of a statute must be read in context and
given their place in the overall statutory scheme; federal statutes cannot be
interpreted to negate their own stated purposes; and fundamental details of
a regulatory scheme are not altered in vague or ancillary provisions.132 The
dissent employed its own canons to refute the majority’s conclusion: the
plain and obvious meaning of a statute is preferable to other meanings; it is
presumed that lawmakers use words in their natural and ordinary

128. Id. at 2488 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159
(2000)).
129. Id. at 2488–89 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 159).
130. Id. at 2489 (citations omitted).
131. Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132–33).
132. Id. at 2489, 2493, 2495. The Court examined the definitional provisions of the statute and,
similar to the Fourth Circuit, found that the most natural meaning of the definitional provisions would
result in no qualified individuals for the Federal Exchange and that such Exchange would not be an
Exchange at all—results clearly not contemplated by the statute. Id. at 2490–91. Moreover, unless the
Federal Exchange is deemed established under the same statutory provision as State Exchanges, none of
the statutory requirements are applicable to the Federal Exchange. Id. at 2491. In addition, the Court
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the information reporting requirements imposed on the Federal
Exchange made little sense if tax credits were not available to enrollees in such Exchange. Id. at 2491–
92. Apparently, the importance of contextual analysis -the first canon noted—to Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy varies from case to case. Ironically, in another case that involved the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, both the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy placed significant
emphasis on the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” in reaching the conclusion that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was applicable to closely-held corporations. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2768–70.
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signification; lawmakers do not use terms that have no operation at all; and
specific terms govern over general terms.133
The enlistment of these tools by both the majority and the dissent was
made for one purpose—to answer the question of whether Congress
intended for tax credits to be available to enrollees on the Federal
Exchange.134 The Court found it possible to interpret the language of
I.R.C. section 36B either to limit tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges
or to permit enrollees on both State and the Federal Exchange to qualify for
tax credits.135 The Court examined the broader structure of the legislation
to clarify the ambiguity in favor of the government.136
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, asserted that
Congress could not have “come up with a clearer way to limit tax credits to
State Exchanges than to use the words ‘established by the State.’”137
Conceding that context always is a relevant consideration in statutory
interpretation, Justice Scalia stated that context “is a tool for understanding
the terms of the law, not an excuse for rewriting them.”138 Moreover, the
dissent disagreed that the statutory language evidenced the intent to treat

133. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2497–2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. It has been suggested that this case also concerned two broader issues—the manner in which
legislation is drafted and debated and the appropriateness of increasing the compliance burden on an
already overburdened I.R.S. See Armando Gomez, Why Should Tax Lawyers Care About King v.
Burwell?, 2015 COLUM. J. TAX L.-TAX MATTERS 4, 5 (2015). Whether or not the Court could have, or
should have, considered those issues is beyond the scope of this work.
135. King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. at 2491. The Court noted that its preference for the avoidance of
surplusage is not an absolute rule and rejected the notion that if Congress intended the tax credits to be
available for qualified individuals enrolled on all Exchanges then the words “established by the State”
would have been unnecessary. Id. at 2492. The legislation was poorly drafted due, in large part, to the
political machinations that were employed in order to secure its passage. Id. Accordingly, the Court
found that the phrase “an Exchange established by the State” to be ambiguous. Id.
136. According to the Court, a limitation of tax credits to enrollees on State Exchanges would
“likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act to avoid.” Id. at 2492–93. Such an
interpretation would run counter to the canon that federal statutes cannot be interpreted to negate their
own stated purpose. Id. at 2493 (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
419–20 (1973)). The Court, rejecting the assertion that Congress believed that the limitation of tax
credits to enrollees in State Exchanges would entice the states to establish Exchanges, believed that the
establishment of a Federal Exchange evidenced that Congress contemplated state reluctance to
cooperate and established the Federal Exchange as a fallback in the event of such state reluctance. Id.
at 2494. Finally, the Court delved into the intricacies of § 36B and noted that the denial of tax credits,
if such credits are to be denied, becomes evident only after delving into a “sub-sub-sub section” of the
statute. Id. at 2495. Due to the fundamental importance of the tax credits to the overall statutory
scheme, the Court believed that a congressional intent to deny such credits would have been made
known in a prominent way and not buried in the interstices of the statute. Id.
137. Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. Justice Scalia did not believe that the phrase “established by the State” was surplusage.
Redundant language is commonly used by lawmakers but the majority violated a virtually absolute
principle of statutory construction by rendering the phrase in question a nullity. Id. at 2498. Because
this language was repeated seven times throughout the statute but not throughout the entire statute,
common sense dictates that the use of a phrase in some cases and another phrase in other cases indicates
that the two phrases have contrasting meanings. Id. at 2498–99.
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the Federal and State Exchanges as equivalent and that the majority’s
interpretation rendered various statutory provisions nonsensical.139 Justice
Scalia was unmoved by the majority’s reliance on the legislation’s design
and purpose. The notion that the health insurance market would be
destabilized by the lack of tax subsidies to enrollees in the Federal
Exchange, if true, is not proof that the statute does not mean what it says
but is just a flaw in the law.140 Justice Scalia accused the majority of
ignoring other competing purposes.
The legislation evidences the
congressional desire for state participation in the establishment and
management of Exchanges and a holding contrary to the majority’s would
encourage states to establish their own Exchanges thereby achieving the
market reforms desired with active state participation.141

1. Analysis and Critique
The Court came to the conclusion that Congress intended to make tax
credits available to enrollees in the Federal Exchange. At that point, there
is no ambiguity, Chevron step one is failed, and that should have been the
end of the inquiry. In Chevron, the Court noted that ". . . [i]f this choice
represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were
committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the
accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."142 The
Court failed to explain how an accommodation that Congress would not
have sanctioned could ever be a “reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency’s care.”
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon, the authors who gave
prominence to the issue in King v. Burwell, stated the following:

139. Several provisions of the legislation mandated state officials to undertake certain tasks
related to the administration of Exchanges. The dissent questioned how a state official possibly could
undertake those tasks for an Exchange that is operated by the federal government. Id. at 2499. Even if
it were true that Congress intended to equate the two types of Exchanges in general, for the specific
purpose of the tax credits the two types of Exchanges are not equivalent. Id. at 2500. The dissent found
nothing unusual in the fact that the limitation of tax credits to enrollees in State Exchanges is found in a
formula, rather than a definitional, provision. Such drafting is common in the I.R.C. Id. at 2501–02
(providing several examples of such drafting).
140. Id. at 2503. Moreover, this flaw existed, without dispute, in the long-term care insurance
program established by the legislation and in the general insurance market in the Federal Territories.
Id. Whether or not the statute was the result of Congress’s lack of due care and deliberation was of no
moment to the dissent. It is not the role of the Court to amend a law that says what Congress did not
intend to say or “to make everything come out right when Congress does not do its job properly.” Id. at
2506.
141. Id. at 2504.
142. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. at 845 (quoting United States v.
Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382–83 (1961)).
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Suppose, however, the IRS was able to convince a reviewing
court that the PPACA is ambiguous on whether it limits tax
credits to state-based Exchanges. The IRS would also need to
demonstrate that this ambiguity was evidence of an implicit
delegation of authority to interpret the statute in a way that would
authorize the creation of new tax credits, new entitlement
spending, and new taxes on employers and individuals beyond the
purview of the traditional legislative appropriations process. This
is not the sort of authority one should lightly presume Congress
delegated to an agency. To paraphrase the Supreme Court,
Congress does not hide such “elephants in mouseholes.”143
If Congress does not hide “elephants in mouseholes” then there should be
no ambiguity that would justify Treasury’s action. Again, either the issue
was committed to the agency’s care or it was not. Clarity of statutory
language is, of course, the best evidence of whether or not a statute
evidences a congressional intent with respect to the issue in question. If
I.R.C. section 36B stated that tax credits are available to eligible
individuals enrolled on “any Exchange,” or, alternatively, “an Exchange
established by a State (but not the Federal government or any
instrumentality therefor)” then the intent of Congress would have been
manifested clearly. Unfortunately, Congress often does not manifest its
intent in so obvious a manner. Chief Justice Roberts stated that the
meaning of the term “established by the State” was ambiguous but then
proceeded to explain why Congress intended for such term to encompass
the Federal Exchange.144 Ambiguity of language should not be confused
with ambiguity of intent. Congressional intent can be gleaned from
extraneous sources as the Court did in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., a case in which it exhaustively examined other
congressional actions to determine that Congress did not intend to provide
the FDA with regulatory authority over tobacco.145
The importance of the issue, whether to an overall regulatory scheme,
to the economy, or to some other matter of import may be—and perhaps
should be—a factor in the courts’ inquiry with respect to congressional
intent but it should not be treated as conclusive evidence of Congress’s
intent. Common sense dictates that the more central that the resolution of a
seeming ambiguity is to a regulatory scheme the more likely it is that the
legislature intended a particular result. However, Congress may have given
no thought at all to the matter for one of two reasons. First, the matter may
implicate the application of a statutory requirement to one of many possible
143. Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representation: The Illegal IRS
Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119, 180 (2013) (quoting Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
144. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
145. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 592 U.S. at 133–56.
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fact patterns potentially covered by the rule and Congress intended an
agency to deal with such specifics. It is precisely these situations that
justify Chevron deference because the regulatory agencies have the policy
and technical expertise to deal with such situations and the flexibility to
alter their positions as circumstances warrant.
Second, Congress may not have contemplated the issue at all and the
issue’s importance casts doubt on Congress’s intent to delegate its
resolution to an agency. Such a situation may arise, for example, as a result
of technological, legal, or social developments not contemplated by
Congress at the time the legislation was enacted. In such circumstances, the
courts should invalidate the regulations in question and leave the matter for
Congress to resolve. Neither FDA v. Brown & Williamson nor King v.
Burwell presented a case in which Congress gave no thought to a matter of
extraordinary importance. In both cases, the Court was able to glean
Congress’s intent with the respect to the issue presented. Both cases
were—in reality—decided at Chevron step one.
Whether an issue’s importance negates congressional delegation is
itself a difficult issue.146 King v. Burwell would appear to be an easy case
in this respect because qualification for tax credits is critical to the
operation of the health care reforms advanced by the statute and presented
an issue that was contemplated by Congress. Yet, the Court and the Fourth
Circuit court came to opposite conclusions about whether Congress
implicitly delegated authority to the I.R.S.147 Less than a decade ago, the
Sixth and Second Circuits upheld the so-called “check-the box” regulations
that were issued ten years previously.148 These regulations dealt with the
For decades, the
classification of an entity for tax purposes.149

146. Assume that the phrase “established by the State but not by the federal government or any
instrumentality thereof)” replaced the language presently found in I.R.C. § 36B and that neither the
statute nor its legislative history made mention of the possibility that states and the federal government
could partner to operate an Exchange. Assume further that the Treasury Department issued regulations
that defined an Exchange “established by the State (but not by the federal government or any
instrumentality thereof)” to include Exchanges that were operated by states in partnership with the
Department of Health and Human Services. This regulation would satisfy both the policy goal of
insurance affordability and the policy goal of state participation. If Congress contemplated that states
would either form an Exchange or would not participate at all then the possibility of a federal-state
partnership in operating an Exchange would not have occurred to Congress at the time the legislation
was deliberated and enacted. However, if a great number of states chose to partner with the Department
of Health and Human Services then the importance of this issue to the overall statutory scheme would
be significant. It is unclear how a court would determine whether this issue is of such import to negate
the implication that Congress intended the Treasury Department to deal with it.
147. See King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d at 373. The Court had indicated, in Smiley v. Citibank, 517
U.S. 735 (1996), that conflicting interpretations of a statute by courts—in this case, the Supreme Courts
of New Jersey and California—provides strong evidence of statutory ambiguity. Intuitively, the same
inference should be drawn by conflicting interpretations of a statute by the Circuit Courts.
148. See Littriello v. United States, 448 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1186
(2008); McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007).
149. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, et. seq. (1996).
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classification of an entity as a corporation or a partnership for tax purposes
was determined by the examination of certain attributes of the entity in
question.150 The emergence of limited liability companies (LLCs ) during
the 1990s magnified the importance of entity classification because the
LLC form provided taxpayers with an extremely flexible non-corporate
vehicle with which to limit the personal liability exposure of the entity’s
owners. The Treasury regulations completely discarded the previous entity
classification rules and adopted a system whereby noncorporate entities
elect whether they would be taxed as corporations or partnerships.151
Both the Sixth and Second Circuits upheld the regulations under
Chevron.152 The classification of an entity has enormous tax consequences.
The regulations certainly simplified tax administration and reduced the risk
of tax litigation. Perhaps the emergence of LLCs warranted such
simplification. Equally plausible, however, is that the Treasury regulations
would spell the virtual death knell of the corporate form for non-publicly
traded entities.153 Neither circuit court considered the possibility that
Congress would not have a delegated such a critical matter to the Treasury.
King v. Burwell could undermine the equipoise that Mayo provided
between the I.R.S. and other federal agencies.154 According to the Court, it
was unlikely that Congress delegated the authority to establish a
qualification for tax subsidies, a matter central to the operation of Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, to the I.R.S.155 Chief Justice Roberts
stated that the delegation of such a matter to the I.R.S. was even more
unlikely given its lack of expertise in health care policy.156 Because agency
expertise is one factor that supports Chevron deference, this statement
should trouble the Treasury.157 Tax legislation often serves policy goals
unrelated to revenue collection. Federal housing, education, health care,
and retirement security policy goals are aided, in part, through the tax

150. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, et. seq. (1960); Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S.
344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
151. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-3(a)-(b)(2006). Non-corporate entities owned by one person
elect to be taxed as corporations or to be disregarded. Entities incorporated under a federal or state
statute, insurance companies and banks, entities wholly owned by a State or political subdivision
thereof or a foreign government, and certain foreign entities are treated as corporations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(b)(2012).
152. Littriello v. United States, 448 F.3d at 378; McNamee v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 488 F.3d at
105. I offer no opinion on whether Chevron was applied properly in these cases.
153. Publicly traded entities, except for entities who generate at least 90 percent of their gross
income from certain passive sources, are treated as corporations regardless of the entities’ legal form.
See generally I.R.C. § 7704(CCH 2016).
154. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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system.158 Will I.R.S. lack of expertise in these areas somehow subject its
regulations to greater scrutiny? At a minimum, such a statement provides
fodder for taxpayers to challenge Treasury regulations.
B.The State Farm Doctrine
The Administrative Procedure Act permits a court to invalidate
agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.159 One year before Chevron the
Court decided the seminal case concerning the Act’s arbitrary and
capricious standard, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.160 The
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, enacted to reduce
automobile accidents and the deaths and injuries that ensued from such
accidents, directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue practical and
objective motor vehicle safety standards.161 The statute also directed the
Secretary to consider all relevant safety data and the reasonableness and
practicality of proposed safety standards and whether such standards will
contribute to carrying out the purpose of the statute.162 Between 1967 and
1978 the Department of Transportation issued several standards, at first
simply requiring automobile manufacturers to install seatbelts and later
requiring full passive front seat occupant restraint systems—automatic
seatbelts or airbags—in model year 1984 vehicles.163 In 1981, the
158. See e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A (providing a credit for certain educational expenses); 36 (providing a
credit for first time homebuyers); 105 (providing an exclusion for employer provided medical
insurance); 213 (providing a deduction for medical and dental expenses); 401–09 (providing tax
deferred retirement vehicles)(CCH 2016).
159. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(2016). Courts may also set aside agency action that are contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; taken without observance of required procedure; decisions in
certain hearings that are unsupported by substantial evidence; or unwarranted by the facts to the extent
that the facts are subject to a trial de novo. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(B)-(F)(2016). Unless a statute
provides otherwise only final agency actions are reviewable by a court. See 5 U.S.C. § 704(2016). In
general, a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. §
702(2016). However, agency actions are not subject to judicial review if a statute precludes such
review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(1)-(2)(2016). See
supra note 52 for a discussion of actions committed to agency discretion and the non-delegation
doctrine.
160. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id. at 33–34.
163. Id. at 34–37. Originally, passive restraints were required in all vehicles manufactured after
August 15, 1975. In the two years preceding the effective date of the passive restraint requirement
vehicles could be manufactured with passive restraint or shoulder belts coupled with an ignition lock.
The shoulder belt/ignition lock option was selected by most manufacturers but the unpopularity of this
feature led Congress to amend the statute in 1974 to foreclose this option. The effective date was later
postponed for approximately one year and then suspended pending the outcome of a demonstration
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Department ordered a one year delay in the new standard and later
proposed a rescission of the standard. Ultimately, the Department rescinded
the standard.164
The Department of Transportation asserted that it no longer found that
passive restraints would yield significant safety benefits. The agency
assumed that airbags would be installed in sixty percent of new cars and
that the remaining forty percent would comply with the standard through
the installation of automatic seat belts.165 Instead, the vehicle manufactures
planned to meet the standard through the installation of automatic seat belts
in approximately ninety-nine percent of new cars.166 Most automatic seat
belts could be disengaged with relative ease. As a result, the agency
believed that the costs to comply with the standard would be unreasonable
in light of the minimal safety benefits to be derived from its imposition.167
In addition, the agency believed that the imposition of an expensive, yet
ineffective, standard would negatively affect public attitudes toward
vehicle safety thereby hindering future agency safety initiatives.168
State Farm and an automobile insurance trade group challenged the
rescission of the standard and the D.C. Circuit held that the agency’s
rescission of the safety standard was not supported by clear and convincing
reasons because there was insufficient evidence to support the agency’s
conclusion regarding seat belt use and because the agency failed to give
due consideration to either a requirement to install non-detachable seat
belts or a requirement to install airbags.169 The Court agreed with the D.C.
Circuit that rescission of a regulation is reviewable under the arbitrary and
capricious standard but it held so in more sweeping terms. According to
the Court, “the revocation of an extant regulations is substantially different
than a failure to act” and such a change in course obligates an agency “to
supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be

project. Finally, a new Secretary of Transportation had the Department of Transportation issue the new
standard in 1978. The standard was to be phased in first with large cars in model year 1982 and then to
all cars by model year 1984. Id. at 37.
164. Id. at 38.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 39.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 39–40. The court held that the rescission was reviewable under the arbitrary and
capricious standard and that such rescission was not analogous to a failure to issue regulations. The
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes a court to compel agency action that has unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(2016). However, the courts are much more reluctant to
compel agency action than they are to invalidate actions once such actions are taken. In general, courts
will compel action only if they find that the agency has a clear, nondiscretionary duty to act. Moreover,
many forms of agency inaction are considered committed to agency discretion by law or are not deemed
final agency action, and therefore, unreviewable. Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial
Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 465–66 (2008).
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required when an agency does not act in the first instance.”170 The Court,
however, disagreed with the lower court that this particular rescission was
subject to a heightened standard of review due to congressional action. The
standard of review, in this case the arbitrary and capricious standard, is
neither enlarged nor diminished by subsequent congressional action.171
The Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow
and does not invite a court to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.172 However, an agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action and there must be a rational connection between the facts
found and the agency’s action.173 According to the Court, an agency rule is
arbitrary and capricious if the agency: 1) relied on factors that Congress did
not intend it to consider; 2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the issue in question; 3) offered an explanation that is counterfactual; or
4) offered an explanation that is so implausible that it belies a difference of
opinion or agency expertise.174 An agency’s reasoning may be discerned
by a court if its reasoning is opaque.175 However, the Court, citing SEC v.
Chenery Corp, stated that the judiciary cannot make up for agency
deficiencies nor provide a reasoned basis for an agency’s action that has
not been advanced by the agency itself.176
The Court held that the rescission of the passive restraint requirement
was arbitrary and capricious. With respect to air bags, the Court held that
the Department of Transportation’s belief that detachable seat belts would
prove ineffective, even if proven true, in no way provides a rational basis
for rescinding the airbag requirement.177 The Court found that the
Department of Transportation gave no consideration to amending the
standard to mandate airbags in light of its position that detachable seat belts
are not effective.178 The agency’s assertions that airbags create difficulties
in the production of small cars and that public reaction to mandatory
airbags would be negative were, according to the Court, post hoc
rationalizations.179 Chenery mandates that agency action, if it is to be
sustained, be based on the reasons articulated by the agency when it took
action.180

170. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 41–42.
171. Id. at 44–45.
172. Id. at 43.
173. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inv. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)).
177. Id. at 48–49.
178. Id. at 50.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inv. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 168; SEC v. Chenery
Corp. 332 U.S. at 196; Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981)).
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With respect to automatic seatbelts, the Court held that the agency
failed to consider evidence regarding the effect that detachable seat belts
would have on vehicle safety. The Court acknowledged that agencies often
operate in the face of uncertainty, that no evidence in direct support of a
conclusion may be available, and that policy conclusions may be the result
of judgments drawn from facts and probabilities.181 However, an agency
must do more than merely recite “substantial uncertainty” as its rationale
for an action.182 Instead, it must rationally connect the facts found with the
choice made and justify why it is rescinding a rule before searching for
further evidence.183 The Court found the Department of Transportation’s
reliance on test data and manual seat belt usage data to be inadequate and,
in certain respects, misplaced.184 The Court also held that the agency did
not adequately consider a “continuous passive” seat belt option as a
solution to the problems posed by automatic seat belts.185

1. Is State Farm Distinct from Chevron?
In many respects, State Farm’s “hard look” review of agency action is
difficult to extricate from the Chevron two step test. If an agency came to
an action based on factors that Congress did not intend the agency to
consider then such action apparently would fail Chevron step one because
Congress left no ambiguity for the agency to act upon—at least with
respect to the factors that Congress prohibited. In most cases, the
application of State Farm and Chevron step two will lead to similar
conclusions. For example, if agency justification for an action is
counterfactual or implausible then that action is unlikely to pass muster
under Chevron step two. Likewise, if the agency entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the issue in question then whatever action was taken
by the agency is unlikely to satisfy Chevron step two. The American Bar
Association and several scholars have argued that the arbitrary and
capricious standard should be incorporated into Chevron step two because
both tests involve similar inquiries and that the discernment of a conceptual
distinction between the two standards is difficult.186 I agree that Chevron
and State Farm may be inextricable when Chevron step two is failed. I am
not convinced, however, that the failure to meet the State Farm standard is
a sufficient condition for the failure of Chevron step two.
It is possible to discern a distinction between State Farm and Chevron.
The latter inquires whether an agency has reasonably interpreted the law
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 51–52.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 52–54.
Id. at 55.
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 162 –63 (2010).
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while the former inquires whether the agency has articulated a reasonable
factual and/or policy basis for its actions. The law versus facts distinction
between the two tests implies, somewhat counterintuitively, that the courts
are more likely to defer to an agency’s interpretation of law than to an
agency’s factual and policy conclusions. This point was made by Justice
Breyer.187 In many, if not most, cases, both State Farm and Chevron will
yield the same result. However, the tests are not identical. While Chevron
rests on notions of agency expertise and congressional intent, State Farm
has other justifications, including the imposition of discipline on agency
decisions, the legitimization of agency action, and enablement of judicial
review.188 State Farm more appropriately should be seen as an additional
hurdle for agencies to jump after they have cleared Chevron step two.
Assuming that the requisite statutory gap exists Chevron step two
prohibits agency actions that are either arbitrary and capricious in
substance or contrary to the statute.189 As discussed earlier, if Chevron step
one does not yield a mandatory result then Chevron step two permits any
number of alternatives so long as those alternatives are reasonable. State
Farm inquires why the agency chose a particular alternative among the
possible permissible alternatives and examines if the reasons articulated by
the agency make sense in light of the factual record and congressional
policy preferences. It is conceivable that an agency choose a course of
action that, in substance, does no violence to the statute yet is not
adequately justified by the agency.
In fact, State Farm itself and Mayo provide examples of this
possibility. In State Farm, the statute in question provided the Department
of Transportation with significant latitude to take action to improve motor
vehicle safety.190 Had the Department of Transportation issued a rule that
mandated only passive seat belts, only air bags, seat belts for certain cars
and air bags for others, or manual seat belts with an interlock or buzzer
feature, I imagine that Chevron step two would have sanctioned each of
these alternatives. Each of these alternatives appears to be reasonable
under the statutory mandate. At this point, State Farm requires the agency
to articulate the facts to support the choice it made. In Mayo, Treasury
regulations required that medical residents be subject to payroll taxes.191
The Court found that the I.R.C. did not address the issue of student-workers

187. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 765 (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 394 (1986)).
188. See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality,
and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1820–23 (2012).
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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thereby Chevron step one was met.192 The regulations in question
addressed the status of such individuals on the basis of hours worked as
opposed to the primary purpose of the work.193 Determining full-time
employment status on the basis of hours worked is neither arbitrary or
capricious in substance nor contrary to the statute. The Treasury
articulated satisfactory reasons for its choice of hours worked as the critical
variable in determining full-time employment status.194 Had the Treasury
failed to provide reasons for its choice the regulations in question would
have been invalidated under State Farm but not under Chevron.
Chevron step two is, or should be, applied in the abstract. Does the
statute permit this action? If the answer to this question is no then State
Farm is inapplicable. If the answer to this question is yes, then State Farm
takes a hard look at the reasons behind the action. The fact that the failure
of Chevron step two inevitably will result in the failure of the State Farm
test does not mean that the opposite is true. Chevron step two may be met
yet State Farm may be violated.
For a tax attorney, State Farm meant insurance and not part of her
administrative law tool kit. Unlike Chevron, National Muffler, Skidmore,
and, more recently, Mayo the State Farm case garnered little attention from
the tax bar. The Supreme Court has never examined tax regulations under
the State Farm standard.195 Recently, State Farm has surfaced in two tax
cases. In one case, the court applied both Chevron and State Farm to
invalidate a Treasury regulation. In the other, a case with significant
financial ramifications for multinational enterprises, the court invalidated a
Treasury regulation under State Farm.

2. State Farm and Tax Regulations
a. Dominion Resources
I.R.C. section 263A, the uniform capitalization rules, sets forth rules
for the capitalization of costs attributable to real or personal property
produced by a taxpayer and to real or personal property acquired by a
taxpayer for resale.196 Under the statute, both direct and indirect costs are

192. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 52–53.
193. See id. at 50.
194. The Treasury justified its actions on the basis of administrative efficiency and the policy
underlying the Social Security Act. See id. at 59–60.
195. Two scholars recently examined all Supreme Court decisions between 1983 and 2014 that
involved an arbitrary and capricious holding. Their compilation included one tax case, Mayo. See
Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1407–12 (2016).
However, the Court did not review the Treasury regulation at issue in that case under State Farm. See
supra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
196. I.R.C. § 263A(a)–(b)(CCH 2016).
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subject to capitalization.197 Interest costs incurred during the production
period and allocable to real property and certain personal property with a
long useful life are subject to capitalization.198 In determining the amount
of interest expense required to be capitalized interest on any debt that is
directly attributable to production expenditures with respect to a property
are assigned to that property.199 In addition, interest on any other debt is
assigned to property under production to the extent that such debt could
have been reduced if the production expenditures had not been incurred.200
Thus, interest expense directly incurred by reason of production is
capitalizable, such as interest on a construction loan. Moreover, if
production is financed by equity, internal cash flow, asset sales, or some
other non-debt source of funds, then interest expense on any debt is
capitalizable under the theory—or fiction—that, but the production
expenditures, debt unrelated to production could have been paid down.
The Treasury issued regulations that defined production expenditures,
in the case of the purchase of property for further production, to include not
only the costs of acquisition of the property and the improvements thereto
but also the adjusted basis of other property that is temporarily idled by the
production.201 This has the effect of adding to the total production
expenditures and thereby increasing the amount of interest that must be
capitalized. In Dominion Resources v. United States, the validity of the
regulation was challenged and the Court of Federal Claims applied
Chevron and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.202
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the Court of Federal Claims
and held that the regulation in question failed both Chevron step two and
the State Farm test.203
The court concurred with the lower court that the statute’s definition
of production expenditures was opaque, circular, and did not speak directly
to the issue at hand.204 Accordingly, Chevron step one was satisfied.205
The court, however, did not believe that the inclusion of the basis of idled
property in the production costs for which interest must be capitalized was
197. I.R.C. § 263A(a)(2)(CCH 2016).
198. I.R.C. §§ 263A(f)(1); 263A(f)(4)(A)(CCH 2016). The interest capitalization rules also apply
to property whose estimated production period exceeds two years or whose estimated production period
exceeds one year and whose cost exceeds $1,000,000. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii)(CCH 2016).
199. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(1)(CCH 2016).
200. I.R.C. § 263A(f)(2)(A)(2)(CCH 2016).
201. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B)(1994).
202. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2011), rev’d, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed.
Cir. 2012). The court upheld the regulation despite its finding of several internal inconsistencies within
the regulations and its belief that the regulation’s interpretation of the statute stretched the bounds of
reasonableness. See id. at 257.
203. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 97 Fed.
Cl. 239 (2011).
204. Dominion Res., 681 F.3d at 1317
205. Id.
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a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court examined the statute’s
language and its legislative history and concluded, for three reasons, that
the rule did not implement the avoided cost principal in a sensible
manner.206
First, the court noted that the premise of the avoided cost rule is that
debt could have been reduced had production expenditures not been
incurred. However, no such reduction in debt could have occurred with
respect to the basis of an existing, yet idled facility.207 The cost of the idled
property cannot be an avoided cost because such cost had already been
incurred prior to production.208 The Treasury’s position makes sense only
if one assumes that the idled facility could have been sold and the sale
proceeds used to pay down debt. This assumption belies reality because
such a sale obviates the very reason for any improvement to the property.209
Second, the court proceeded to parse the statutory language and held
that the plain meaning of production expenditures is an amount actually
expended or spent.210 Moreover, the statute determined the amount of
interest to be capitalized based on the amount of debt that could have been
reduced had no production expenditures been incurred. The basis of
existing property is not an amount that is incurred by a taxpayer.211
Finally, the court concluded that the Treasury regulation could lead to
absurd results. The adjusted basis of idled property bears little relation to
the cost of improvements. Consequently, the same improvement could
result in significantly different amounts of interest capitalized.212
Dominion’s two improvements were comparable in cost yet the regulations
required vastly different amounts of interest to be capitalized solely
because the adjusted basis of the two idled properties that were improved
differed by over $100 million.213
The court further held that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious
under State Farm because the Treasury offered no rationale when it issued
the notice that provided guidance on the forthcoming regulation or when it
issued the regulation in either proposed or final form.214 The court believed
that Court of Federal Claims erroneously concluded that the Treasury’s
reasoning was murky yet discernable.215 Moreover, the fact that the
Treasury announced its position in advance is not sufficient to satisfy its

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1318–19.
Id. at 1318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id.
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obligation under State Farm.216 State Farm is rarely applied in tax cases
and Dominion Resources was the first appellate decision that invoked it to
invalidate tax regulations.217

1. Analysis and Critique
The Federal Circuit’s application of Chevron and State Farm is
somewhat puzzling. The court held that Chevron step one was met.
However, one its reasons for rejecting the regulation under Chevron step
two was the court’s belief that the statutory language plainly did not
contemplate the Treasury’s interpretation.218 If so, then I fail to see how
Chevron step one was met. If the meaning of the terms “expended,”
“spent,” and “incurred” are plain then the statute does speak to the precise
issue at hand. Moreover, having held that the regulations failed Chevron
step two, there was no need for the court to delve into State Farm. Based
on the court’s Chevron analysis any Treasury explanation for its position
would have been irrelevant.
Judge Clevenger’s concurrence, in my opinion, nicely draws a
distinction between Chevron step two and State Farm. He agreed that the
Treasury proffered no reasonable explanation for its interpretation of the
avoided cost rule and, therefore, the regulation should be invalidated under
State Farm.219 However, he did not believe that the regulation should have
been invalidated under Chevron step two.220 Noting that the avoided cost
rule is a fiction, the judge articulated several reasons why the Treasury’s
position merited serious consideration.221 For example, the idling of a
facility does result in the incurrence of costs—lost revenue, for example.222
Moreover, the regulation minimizes the opportunity for tax evasion. The
basis of purchased property that has never been placed in service and
improved is subject to interest capitalization. The regulation at issue
prevents a taxpayer from temporarily placing such a property in service to
avoid interest capitalization.223

216. Id.
217. In Manella v. Comm’r, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011), the court upheld the validity of a
Treasury regulation under Chevron. The dissent quoted from State Farm but the quote was used to
support the argument that Chenery precluded the court from considering the Treasury’s assertions in
this case. See id. at 127 (Ambro, J. dissenting). See supra notes 176, 180 for a discussion of Chenery.
State Farm surfaced in a number of Tax Court cases over twenty years ago. See Patrick J. Smith,
Manella, State Farm, and the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard, 131 No. 4, TAX NOTES 387, 393 n.44
(2011).
218. See supra note 210-11 and accompanying text.
219. Dominion Res., 681 F.3d at 1320 (Clevenger, J. concurring).
220. Id. at 1321.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1321–22.
223. Id. at 1322.
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Judge Clevenger correctly noted that the majority’s application of
Chevron “creates a binding rule (at least in this circuit) that the government
can never re-promulgate its associated-property rule for property
temporarily withdrawn from service, no matter how well-formed its
reasoning.”224 Therein lies the distinction between Chevron and State
Farm. If a regulation fails Chevron step two then State Farm is not relevant
anymore because no explanation can turn an unreasonable position into a
reasonable one. As previously discussed, Chevron step two should permit
any agency interpretation of a statute that is reasonable in the abstract.225
At that point, the agency must articulate its reasons for why its particular
interpretation was advanced.
Admittedly, in circumstances that do not involve statutory
interpretation the determination of whether an agency action is permissible
in the abstract cannot be ascertained without examining the factual basis for
the action.226 In such circumstances, Chevron and State Farm are joined
quite firmly.227 In a deportation case, Justice Kagan conceded that the
Court would have reached the same conclusion whether it reviewed a
Board of Immigration Appeals’ action under Chevron step two or State
Farm. She also stated “. . . that the more apt analytic framework in this case
is standard ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ review under the APA. The BIA’s
comparable-grounds policy . . . is not an interpretation of any statutory
language . . . .”228 However, a statutory interpretation that requires no
empirical data for support, as was the case in Mayo, or a statutory
interpretation for which no reasoned explanation is articulated, as was the
case in State Farm and, according to Judge Clevenger, in Dominion
Resources, very well may be permissible in the abstract.229

224. Id. at 1322–23. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial
Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (discussing the circumstances in which a
court will or will not remand a matter to an agency for further consideration); See also Allied-Signal,
Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F. 2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that in certain
circumstances, remand without vacatur is appropriate).
225. See supra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
226. For example, assume that a statute requires that compensation must be reasonable to be
deductible and that reasonableness is to be determined based on compensation paid for comparable
work in comparable circumstances. If the Treasury issued a regulation that determined reasonableness
based on some metric such as profit, revenue, or some other such variable then whether this regulation
is a permissible interpretation of the statute depends on whether the factual data supports that such a
rule approximates comparable pay standards. If not, it is not a permissible interpretation but this cannot
be determined until a hard look review of the Treasury’s reasoning takes place.
227. See e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 484 n.7 (2011) (stating that the application of
Chevron step two to a deportation action would have yielded the same result as the Court’s application
of State Farm when the agency’s discretion was not exercised in a reasonable manner).
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 177-85, 219 and accompanying text.
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a. Altera
The taxation of U.S. based multinational entities has garnered
significant attention in recent years. Depending on one’s point of view,
U.S. corporations are improperly shifting taxable income to foreign
subsidiaries domiciled in low or no tax jurisdictions or are understandably
doing their best to avoid the taxation of world-wide income at draconian
tax rates.230 Although recent attention has been focused on the creative tax
planning techniques of Apple, Google, and other prominent companies or
on corporate acquisitions which result in a foreign situs for the parent
company—so-called inversion—the prevention of improper income
shifting by U.S. corporations has been a long-standing tax policy.231 In
general, transactions between related entities are respected provided their
terms are at arm’s length.
I.R.C. section 482 seeks to determine the “true taxable income” of a
controlled taxpayer by putting such taxpayer in “tax parity with an
uncontrolled taxpayer.”232 This provision grants the I.R.S. broad authority
to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, and
allowances among controlled taxpayers as is necessary in order to prevent
tax evasion or to clearly reflect the income of such entities.233 Treasury
regulations implement this statutory mandate by means of the “arm’s
length” standard, under which the result of a transaction among controlled
taxpayers is compared to the result that would have arisen had the same
transaction occurred among uncontrolled taxpayers.234 The regulations are
lengthy and complex and deal with various transactions among controlled
taxpayers, including the transfer of property, loans, and leases of
property.235
230. See e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Brian X. Chen, Apple Hits Tax Tension Head-On:
Testimony by Cook Eases the Concerns of Some Senators, N.Y. TIMES May 22, 2013, at B1. See also
Chris William Sanchirico, As American As Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 68
TAX L. REV. 207 (2015).
231. See Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, Inquiry Into Tech Giants' Tax Strategies Nears
End, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 4, 2013, at B1; Charles Duhigg & David Kosieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps
Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 29, 2012, at A1.
232. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1)(2015); Comm’r v. First Sec. Bank, 405 U.S. 394, 400 (1972). A
controlled taxpayer is a taxpayer directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the same interests. A
controlled taxpayer also includes a taxpayer that owns or controls other taxpayers. Treas. Reg. § 1.4821(i)(5)(2015). For this purpose, control is broadly defined. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482–1(i)(4)(2015).
233. I.R.C. § 482 (2016).
234. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1)(2012).
235. Various methodologies are employed under the regulations for determining the arm’s-length
standard in a transaction involving the transfer of tangible property, including the comparable
uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, the cost plus method, the comparable profits
method, and the profits split method. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a)(1995). The
methodologies employed for determining the arm’s-length standard with respect to transactions
involving the transfer of intangible property are the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, the
comparable profits method, and the profits split method. The regulations also allow for unspecified
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In the case of a transfer or license of intangible property the statute
requires that the income with respect to such transfer or license be
commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.236 The
commensurate with income standard for transfers and licenses of
intangibles, enacted in 1986 due to the difficulty in determining
comparable terms for such transactions, requires that the transferor retain
what is referred to as a “super royalty” and allows for ex-post adjustments
based on the income generated from the intangible in question.237 The
Treasury concluded that the commensurate with income standard did not
supplant, but is consistent with, the arm’s length standard.238
The addition of the commensurate with income standard in 1986 was
not intended to prohibit the use of bona fide research and development
cost-sharing arrangements.239 However, the parties to such arrangements
are required to bear a portion of all research and development costs at all
stages of development regardless of the success or failure of the project.240
The regulations contain specific rules related to the joint development of
intangible property under a cost sharing arrangement entered into among
Compliance with these regulations allows
controlled taxpayers.241
taxpayers to avoid the uncertainty of whether these arrangements meet the
arm’s-length standard.242 In general, the parties to a qualified cost-sharing
arrangement share intangible development costs in proportion to the
The Treasury
parties’ share of reasonably anticipated benefits.243
regulations require that stock-based compensation costs directly identified
with, or reasonably allocable to, the development of intangible property be
included in the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing arrangement.244 The
amount and timing of such costs are determined under the rules that govern
the deductibility of such costs.245 However, a taxpayer may elect to
determine the amount and timing of the costs of stock options on publicly
methods to be utilized is such methods otherwise satisfy the arm’s-length standard. See Treas, Reg, §
1,482-4(a)(2011). The best method under the circumstances must be selected. Treas. Reg. § 1.4821(c)(1)(2012).
236. I.R.C. § 482 (2016).
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 423–26 (1985); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Xilinx Revisited, 126
TAX NOTES 1621 (Mar. 29, 2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2)(2011). It is not clear whether the
commensurate with income standard is consistent with, or supersedes, the arm’s-length standard. See
Deborah Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple of Discord: International Cost-Sharing Arrangements, 15
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55, 68 n.57–58 (2015).
238. See Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 472 (1988).
239. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-481 (Vol. II), at II-637–38 (1986).
240. Id.
241. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2013).
242. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(a)(3)(2013). See supra note 235 for the methodologies employed for
determining the arm’s-length standard with respect to transactions involving the transfer of intangible
property.
243. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(a)(1); 1.482-1(b)(2013).
244. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(d)(3)(i)-(ii)(2013).
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(iii)(A)(2013).
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traded stock under generally accepted accounting principles as reflected in
the taxpayer’s audited financial statements.246
For tax purposes, stock grants are taxable to the recipient and deductible by
the employer at the time the stock is transferable by the recipient or not subject to
a substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier.247 The amount of
income recognized by the transferee from such a transaction is the excess of the
fair market value of the property received over the amount paid by the recipient
for such property.248 Correspondingly, the transferor of the property is entitled to
a compensation deduction, at the time the recipient of the property recognizes
income, equal to the amount includible in the income of the recipient.249 If,
however, the stock is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture then the income
recognition and the corresponding deduction is postponed until such time that
the risk of forfeiture lapses.250 However, the recipient of restricted property
may elect to accelerate the incidence of taxation to the time that the
property is transferred.251 This election also accelerates the employer’s
compensation deduction.252
With respect to compensatory stock options, income recognition and
the compensation deduction are postponed until the date of exercise or
disposition provided that, at the time the option is granted, it has no readily
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(d)(3)(iii)(B)(2013).
247. I.R.C. § 83(a)(CCH 2016).
248. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)-(2)(CCH 2016). The fair market value of the property received is
determined at the time the property is transferable by the recipient or is not subject to substantial risk of
forfeiture, whichever is earlier. I.R.C. § 83(a)(1)(CCH 2016). The property recipient is taxable on the
appreciation that occurs between the time of grant and the time of vesting despite the fact that, at the
time of grant, the employee paid full fair market value for the property. See Alves v. Comm’r, 734 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1984), aff’g 79 T.C. 864 (1982).
249. I.R.C. § 83(h) (CCH 2016).
250. Whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists is a factual question based on all the facts and
circumstances. Subjecting the property to continued employment is expressly deemed a substantial risk
of forfeiture. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (1985). Other circumstances evidencing a substantial risk
of forfeiture include performance targets and certain covenants not to compete. The fact that an
employee is subject to the “short-swing” profit rule of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
will cause the property to be deemed to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Treas. Reg. § 1.833(j)(1) (1985).
251. I.R.C. § 83(b)(CCH 2016). The election is irrevocable, except with the permission of the
Commissioner. I.R.C. § 83(b)(2)(CCH 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(f) (1978). The postponement of
taxation until the lapse of vesting restrictions could expose the employee to a very large tax liability if
the stock’s value increases significantly between the time that the property is received and the time that
such property is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. This election is not without its
risks. In a declining market the stock recipient will have recognized an amount of compensation income
based on the value of the stock at the date of grant and any subsequent decline in the value of the stock
will be recognized as a capital loss only upon disposition of the stock. Moreover, no loss is recognized
upon the forfeiture of the shares due to the employee’s failure to meet the vesting requirements. I. R.C.
§ 83(b)(CCH 2016). The employer, however, will recognize income on the forfeiture equal to the
amount of the deduction allowed on the transfer of the forfeited property. Treas. Reg. § 1.836(c)(2003). The no-loss rule is inapplicable to amounts paid for the stock by the employee. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-2(a)(1978).
252. I.R.C. § 83(h)(CCH 2016).
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ascertainable fair market value.253 For this purpose, an option has an
ascertainable fair market value if it is actively traded on an established market or,
alternatively, it is transferable by the option holder, is immediately exercisable,
and the underlying property that is the subject of the option is not subject to any
restriction that has a significant effect on such property’s value.254
Under generally accepted accounting principles, a grant of restricted
shares is valued at the date of grant and such amount is charged to expense
over the vesting period.255 Time-based or performance-based vesting
restrictions do not, for accounting purposes, preclude a determination of the
compensation amount at the time of grant. Instead, such restrictions merely
affect the time over which such amount is charged to expense.256 Implicit
in the accounting treatment of share-based compensation is the notion that
post-grant changes in the market value of the stock are not compensatory in
nature. For accounting purposes, stock options are valued at the date of
grant pursuant to one or more option pricing models.257
The requirement that equity-based compensation—in particular stock
option compensation—be included in the cost pool subject to the cost
sharing arrangement was the subject of a recent Tax Court case. Altera
Corporation, a Delaware corporation, and its Cayman Island subsidiary,
Altera International, entered into a technology licensing agreement and a

253. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a)(1978).
254. Treas. Reg. §§1.83-7(b)(1); 1.83-7(b)(2)(i)-(iii)(1978).
255. See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123, §§
16,39 (Fin. Acct. Standards Bd. revised 2004). This standard conformed U.S. accounting standards
with international accounting standards. See generally SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Int’l Acct. Standards
No. 2 (Int’l Acct. Standards Bd. 2004). Stock options are valued at the date of grant pursuant to one or
more option pricing models. See id., Appendix A at §§ A13-A37.
256. Restrictions that result in the forfeiture of the shares are ignored in determining the fair
market value of the shares at the date of grant. Id. at §18. Thus, shares that are issued subject to a timebased vesting restriction are valued without consideration of the vesting restriction. Moreover, certain
contingent features, such as a clawback provision, are not considered at the time of grant. Instead, such
contingencies are accounted for if, and when, they occur. Id. at § 27. Special rules are provided if, in
addition to time-based restrictions, the award also contains performance-based restrictions. The
existence of performance-based restrictions does not disturb the valuation of the shares at the date of
grant. However, such restrictions may impact the time over which the grant is charged to expense. See
id. at §§ 40–49.
257. See id., Appendix A at §§ A13–A37. Prior to the effective date of this accounting standard,
compensation expense with respect to stock options was measured by the difference between the market
price of the stock underlying the option and the exercise price of the option. As a result, no reported
compensation expense for at-the-money or out-of-the money stock options resulted. ACCOUNTING FOR
STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, Accounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 25, § 10a (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accts. 1972). Later, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued new rules that,
effective until 2005, encouraged the expensing of stock options at the time of grant but allowed
corporations to account for the grants under existing rules provided that additional footnote disclosures
were made. See generally ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION: TRANSITION AND
DISCLOSURE, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 148, (Fin. Acct. Standards Bd. 2002);
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Fin. Acct. Standards No. 123 (Fin.
Acct. Standards Bd. 1995).
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research and development cost-sharing agreement.258 Certain employees of
Altera Corporation who performed research and development activities
were compensated, in part, with stock options and other forms of equitybased compensation.259 The costs associated with this compensation were
not included in the cost pool under the corporation’s cost-sharing
arrangement with its foreign subsidiary.260 The I.R.S. issued notices of
deficiency to Altera Corporation for each of its taxable years 2004-2007
that allocated, in total, approximately $80,000,000 in income from Altera
International to Altera Corporation.261 This income was allocated pursuant
to I.R.C. section 482 and the Treasury regulation noted above as a result of
the addition to the cost pool subject to the cost-sharing arrangement
between the companies of the equity-based compensation paid to research
and development personnel.262
The Tax Court discussed its decision in an earlier case, Xilinx, Inc. v.
Commissioner, that invalidated a previous version of the regulation at issue
and the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of its decision.263 In that case, the Tax
Court invalidated the cost-sharing regulation because it was inconsistent
with the arm’s length standard.264 The evidence indicated that unrelated
parties did not include equity-based compensation in the cost pool subject
to cost-sharing.265 In its affirmance, the Ninth Circuit held that the arm’s
length standard was irreconcilable with the requirement to include all costs,
including equity-based compensation, in the cost pool subject to a costsharing arrangement.266 According to the Court, the regulations created an
ambiguity and—based on the dominant purpose of the regulations—the
arm’s length standard overrides the regulations that require the inclusion of
equity-based compensation in the cost pool.267 The court did not cite or
refer to State Farm but Judge Fisher, in concurrence, conceded that the
Treasury’s position was theoretically plausible but that its position
warranted no deference because the Treasury had not clearly articulated the
rationale for its position.268
Written comments were submitted to the Treasury and testimony
given at a public hearing by several prominent law and accounting firms,
trade associations, and academics regarding the regulation at issue in

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3, 2015 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 31, at *2 (2015).
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *16–21.
See Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. 37, 56–62 (2005).
Id. at 58–62.
Xilinx, Inc. v. Comm’r, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1198 (Fisher, J., concurring).
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Altera.269 The comments and testimony asserted that no contracts between
unrelated parties included equity-based compensation in the cost pool
subject to cost-sharing.270 A survey of members of the American
Electronics Association and model contract provisions used in the
petroleum industry provided further support that such costs are not subject
to cost-sharing between unrelated parties primarily because such costs are
speculative, uncertain, and outside the control of the compensating party.271
In contrast, the Treasury produced no empirical evidence in support of its
position and did not attempt to do so.272 Instead, the Treasury supported its
position in the rather lengthy preamble to the regulations with the assertion
that comparable transactions for high profit intangibles are not available
because transactions between unrelated parties do not share enough
The
characteristics with transactions among controlled parties.273
Treasury’s explanation echoed, to a significant extent, the reasoning set
forth in the legislative history of the statute that enacted the commensurate
with income standard.274
Despite its acknowledgement that the Supreme Court had never
applied State Farm to tax regulations, the court held that State Farm
provided the appropriate standard of review.275 The Treasury argued that
Chevron supplied the appropriate standard of review in this case because
the interpretation of I.R.C. section 482 requires no empirical evidence.276
The court, however, concluded that whether the regulation complied with
the arm’s length standard, which always require an analysis of comparable
unrelated party transactions, is an empirical question and is in no way
dependent on statutory interpretation.277 Accordingly, State Farm provides
“the more apt analytic framework.”278 The court went on to note that
whether it applied State Farm or Chevron in this case was immaterial
because the former is incorporated into the latter.279
The regulations failed to meet the State Farm standard in four ways.
First, the regulations lacked any basis in fact because the Treasury was
unable to produce any evidence that unrelated parties share equity

269. Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. No. 3, 2015 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 31, at *23–24.
270. Id. at *24–25.
271. Id. at *24–27. Commentators also noted that the federal procurement regulations prohibit
the inclusion of equity compensation in the cost-pool subject to federal government reimbursement.
Additionally, two economists argued that compensatory stock options do not result in any cost to the
grantor of the options. See id. at *26–27 (citing 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-6(i)(2013)).
272. Id.at *28–29.
273. Id. at *29–34.
274. Id. at *31.
275. Id. at *45-46, 49.
276. Id. at *46.
277. Id. at *47, 49 (citing Xilinx v. Comm’r, 125 T.C. at 53–55).
278. Id. at *49 (quoting Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 483).
279. Id. at *50 (citing Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. at 483).
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compensation costs.280 The court dismissed the Treasury’s attempt to
justify the rule under the commensurate with income standard because this
standard, by the Treasury’s own admission, is consistent with the arm’s
length standard and, in any event, the Treasury did not rely exclusively on
that standard.281 Moreover, the court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s
assertion that scant empirical evidence exists for certain propositions.
According to the court, the evidence produced that contradicted the
Treasury’s position and the evidence produced in Xilinx belied this
assertion.282 Moreover, the Treasury could not have rationally concluded
that scant evidence was available because it never attempted to marshal any
empirical evidence.283
Second, the court held that there was no rational connection with the
regulations and the facts found by the Treasury.284 If the Treasury was
correct in its belief that cost-sharing arrangements for the development of
high-profit intangibles have no unrelated party counterparts, then the
regulation should have distinguished between cost-sharing arrangements
for the development of such intangibles and those arrangements for the
development of other intangibles.285 Instead, the regulations apply its
requirements to all cost-sharing arrangements. Support for a uniform rule
on the ground of administrative convenience was not sufficient because the
Treasury did not articulate this reason for the rule.286 Moreover, even if
this rationale was articulated, the Treasury provided no facts to determine
whether the rule is justified by its purported administrative benefits.287
Third, the court believed that the Treasury failed to adequately
respond to the comments it received concerning the regulations.288 In many
respects, this failure is closely related to the court’s first objection to the
regulations. The lack of any empirical evidence in support of the
Treasury’s position relegated the Treasury’s response to the comments it
received as mere assertions to the contrary.289 Finally, the court held that
the regulations are contrary to the evidence.290 The credibility of the
evidence marshaled against the regulation was not called into question and
no evidence to the contrary was presented.291

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at *59.
Id. at *51–54.
Id. at *55–57.
Id. at *57.
Id. at *62.
Id. at *59–60.
Id. at *61.
Id.
Id. at *69–70.
Id. at *68–70.
Id. at *70–71.
Id.
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The court dismissed the Treasury’s argument that the regulation
should be upheld under the harmless error rule despite any deficiencies in
the agency’s reasoning.292 The court was not persuaded by the Treasury’s
assertions that it had sufficient alternative reasons for its position and that
subsequent developments in financial reporting evidenced that its position
is settled policy.293 The Treasury never indicated that it was prepared to
rely on any reasons other than the arm’s length standard as a basis for its
adoption of the regulation and, due to treaty obligations, it was not clear
that the agency would have underpinned the rule on something other than
the arm’s length standard.294 With respect to subsequent financial reporting
development the court held that such developments were not relevant
because the Treasury itself disavowed financial reporting standards in
promulgating the rule and, in any event, Chenery precludes reliance on ex
post developments.295

1. Analysis and Critique
Although searching judicial scrutiny of the actions of tax authorities, I
imagine, would be welcome by most taxpayers, the Tax Court’s decision is
perplexing in several respects. First, the court reviewed the Treasury
regulation at issue against the arm’s length standard as if that standard is set
forth in a statute, which it is not. The arm’s length standard is itself a
creature of Treasury regulations.296 Consequently, the court’s application
of the various standards of review was inapt. Second, the court refused to
accept administrative convenience as a reasoned justification for the
regulation without supporting evidence.297 This runs counter to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo and has created confusion as to whether
a naked assertion of administrative convenience will be countenanced as
justification for other regulations. Finally, given the nature and purpose of
the cost-sharing regulations it appears that the Treasury provided a lucid
and reasoned justification despite its failure to muster supporting empirical
data.
The cost-sharing regulations implemented the statutory mandates that
allocations of various tax items clearly reflect income and that the income
with respect to transfers or licenses of intangible assets be commensurate
with the income attributable to the intangibles.298 Clearly, the statutory

292. The harmless error rule is based on § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and allows a
court to upheld an agency action if the agency’s mistake was not outcome determinative. See id at *42.
293. Id. at *71–74.
294. Id. at *72–73.
295. Id. at *73–74.
296. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
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language is sufficiently ambiguous to pass Chevron step one. The court
reviewed the regulations against the arm’s length standard which, in the
court’s opinion, always requires an examination of comparable unrelated
party transactions.299 Accordingly, the court believed that Chevron step
two would have yielded the same result that the application of State Farm
yielded.300 However, even if one concedes that the court was correct that
the arm’s length standard always requires the use of comparable
transactions, the cost-sharing regulations conflicted with a regulation and
not a statutory mandate. Chevron step two should not have been implicated
on this basis. Instead, Auer provides the more appropriate standard of
review.301
The court pointedly noted that the regulation in no way was predicated
on the Treasury’s interpretation of a statute.302 Instead, the Treasury was
required to show whether unrelated parties share equity-based
compensation and this was an empirical question. Accordingly, State Farm
supplied the appropriate standard of review.303 However, the cost-sharing
regulations interpreted the commensurate with income standard and its
relationship to the arm’s length standard.304 In effect, the Treasury was
interpreting both the statute and its own regulations. Chevron step two
should have been applied to determine whether the regulations permissibly
construed the commensurate with income standard and Auer should have
been applied to determine whether the regulations were permissible in light
of the long-standing regulatory-based arm’s length standard.
The
legislative history of the commensurate with income standard stated that
cost-sharing arrangements were permissible if such arrangements provided
for a sharing of all costs.305 In light of the legislative history, the inclusion
of equity compensation costs in the cost pool is, in my opinion, a
reasonable interpretation of the commensurate with income standard and,
therefore, Chevron step two is satisfied. I also believe that the inclusion of
equity-based compensation in the cost pool is not plainly inconsistent with
the arm’s length standard and, therefore, the regulation should pass muster
under Auer. At this point, State Farm requires that the rule chosen by the
Treasury have adequate justification.
The Treasury asserted that the requirement that all cost-sharing
arrangements include equity-based compensation in the cost pool was
based, in part, on administrative convenience.306 The court required more

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
See supra note 54.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
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from the Treasury than a categorical assertion, insisting that the Treasury
provide data to support this justification.307 Administrative convenience is
a common justification for bright-line rules and common sense dictates that
bright-line rules are administrable with relative ease. For example, in
Mayo, the Court accepted the Treasury’s explanation that the rule that
subjects medical residents to payroll taxes was based, in part, on
administrative convenience.308 The Court did not inquire whether a
categorical exemption for medical residents would have yielded similar, or
perhaps, greater administrative benefits. For that matter, the Court did not
examine any supporting data for the Treasury’s assertion that the broad
purposes of the Social Security program were served by a rule that
broadened the program’s coverage. It is quite possible that, after a long
career as a physician, a person’s social security benefits are unaffected by
whether she was subject to tax as a medical resident. Chevron does not
require that the best policy alternative be chosen, only a permissible one.
Neither does State Farm.
The most problematic aspect of the Tax Court’s opinion is that it
failed to understand the nature of the transactions governed by, and the
purpose of, the cost-sharing regulations. As a result, the evidence it
required from the Treasury to satisfy State Farm was impossible to
produce. In many respects, the arm’s length standard is a fiction and, in the
case of high-profit intangible assets, is a fiction. The use of comparable
transactions to ascertain whether transactions between controlled entities
clearly reflect income assumes that transactions between unrelated parties
and transactions among controlled group members share similar economic
attributes. Controlled groups have collective assets—management,
information systems, sources of financing, institutional memory, brand
equity, and culture, for example—that lead such groups to enter into
transactions that would not be offered to anyone outside the group.309
Moreover, the transactional approach of the arm’s length standard often
fails to properly source the parties’ allocable share of non-routine, or
residual, profits.310
The arm’s length standard may be adequate to allocate profits among
controlled group members with respect to the sale of routine goods and
services that have little or no potential to generate residual profits.
However, this standard is not well-suited to a post-industrial economy in
which the creation and use intangible assets is central to wealth creation.

307. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
308. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. at 59.
309. See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the
Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REV. 631, 642–45 (2007).
310. See Bret Well & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion: Reformation of Section 482’s Arm’s
Length Standard, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 737, 745–65 (discussing one-sided and two-sided pricing
methodologies and the deficiencies in the former methodology).
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Intangible assets are often specialized, are efficiently deployed only in the
context of a controlled group, and require exclusivity to protect market
share.311 As a result, comparable transactions do not exist.
The Tax Court, in the absence of evidence that unrelated parties share
equity compensation costs, invalidated the regulations’ requirement that
related parties share such costs. State Farm requires that the Treasury
provide a reasoned explanation for the adoption of the rule in question.
The preamble to the regulations explained that comparable transactions do
not exist for the sharing of research of development costs with respect to
high-profit intangibles and that the regulations attempt to clearly reflect
income among related parties in the absence of such comparable
transactions.312 The explanation put forth echoed the legislative history of
the commensurate with income standard.313 As discussed above, the Tax
Court insisted that the sine qua non of the arm’s length standard is
comparable transactions.314 If one assumes that the court’s interpretation of
the arm’s length standard is the correct one—a dubious assumption—then
such an interpretation fails to cover situations in which no comparable
transactions exist. This was the basis of the Treasury’s adoption of the rule
and was explained as such. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Federal
Communications Commission’s repeal of its long-standing “fleeting
expletives” safe harbor, deferred to the agency’s intuition and noted that
“there are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be
marshalled . . . .”315 Agency intuition forms part of what two scholars
referred to a “tacit expertise” and often influences agency decisions.316
This “tacit expertise” is developed through experience. The Treasury has
grappled with tax base erosion for a long-time and its expertise informed
the belief that unrelated transactions are not comparable to research and
development arrangements among controlled entities.
The court’s rigidity with respect to evidence of comparable costsharing arrangements is all the more perplexing because the cost-sharing
regulations themselves are a safe harbor and deviate from the terms to
which unrelated parties would ostensibly agree. As discussed above, the
cost-sharing regulations were designed as a response to the administrative
burdens and regulatory uncertainty imposed by I.R.C. section 482.317
Adherence to the regulatory requirements provides taxpayers with the
assurance that their resultant profit splits will go undisturbed. Taxpayers
are free to ignore the cost-sharing regulations and take their chances under

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See Benshalom, supra note 309, at 645–47.
See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1813 (2009).
See Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 195, at 1396–1401.
See supra note 242 and accompanying text.

1 - MELONE MACROED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

204

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

5/5/2017 11:08 AM

[Vol. 13:2

the other rules set forth in the regulations. The cost-sharing regulations
contain several provisions whose incorporation into an arm’s length
agreement would be unlikely. For example, the regulations require that a
party to a cost-sharing agreement provide payment for pre-existing research
and platform rights and require adjustments if the actual benefits derived
deviate from projected results to a certain extent.318 Moreover, costs are
funded by the parties in proportion to the benefits they expect to derive
from the research and development effort.319 In contrast to the profit-split
method described elsewhere in the regulations, the cost-sharing regulations
focus solely on funding and make no allowance for expertise and knowhow.320 Moreover, this approach assumes that the funding parties bear
commensurate financial risks which may or may not be true in a controlled
group setting.321
Dominion Resources and Altera may very well motivate taxpayers to
take their scrutiny of tax regulations beyond Chevron. A tax regulation that
appears to be a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute may
nonetheless be inadequately justified by the Treasury. Regulations that are
accompanied by explanations that recite the operation of rules
unaccompanied by the reasons for the rules, that justify bright-line rules on
the grounds of administrative convenience in a conclusory manner, that do
not address comments that object to the rules in question, and that fail to
explain why alternative approaches were dismissed are particularly
vulnerable. Mayo made clear that tax regulations are not exceptional and,
consequently, it should not come as a surprise that administrative law
principles long applicable to other agencies have surfaced in tax cases.
Whether or not the Treasury adjusts its rulemaking procedures probably
depends on the regularity with which State Farm appears on the tax
landscape and whether the courts invalidate regulations that don’t pass
muster or simply remand without vacatur.

318. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7(g); 1.482-7(f)(3)(2013). Valuation of preexisting research and
platform rights poses its own difficulties. See Deepa Seetharaman, IRS Sues Facebook Over Irish
Transfer, WALL ST. J. July 8, 2016, at B4 (reporting on the dispute between the I.R.S. and Facebook
over the valuation of certain intangible assets transferred to its Irish subsidiary).
319. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
320. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(b)(2009). This provisions states that “[t]he relative
value of each controlled taxpayer's contribution to the success of the relevant business activity must be
determined in a manner that reflects the functions performed, risks assumed, and resources employed
by each participant in the relevant business activity . . . .”
321. See Benshalom, supra note 309, at 660–61. See also Debra Brubaker Burns, Golden Apple
of Discord: International Cost-Sharing Arrangements, 15 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 55 (2015)
(discussing the application of the cost-sharing regulations to Apple, Inc.).
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CONCLUSION
From a procedural standpoint, Treasury rulemaking has been subject
to much criticism. The agency too often has skirted the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act and its behavior led to much confusion
regarding the level of judicial deference to which its actions were entitled.
Mayo made clear that Treasury regulations were entitled to the same
deference as that enjoyed by other agency regulations. At the time, Mayo
was interpreted as an unmitigated victory for the Treasury. King v.
Burwell, however, provides taxpayers with two arguments with which to
challenge the agency’s entitlement to Chevron deference—the
extraordinary issue and the Treasury’s lack of expertise. Moreover, as two
recent tax cases illustrate, the equipoise that Mayo created between
Treasury and other agency regulations has introduced the State Farm
doctrine to tax rulemaking. As a result, the Treasury may be forced to
provide more reasoned justifications for its actions than it has been
accustomed to providing.

